Author: Rong Ping Source: official account: Rong Ping (ID: rongping898) has been authorized to reprint
The United States has not yet recovered from the fear of global de dollarization, and has been stunned by the news that Argentina and China have signed the cooperation plan for jointly building the “the Belt and Road” initiative, which marks that Argentina has completed all procedures and become a full member of the “the Belt and Road” initiative.
In the eyes of the Chinese people, this cooperation between China and Afghanistan is a strong alliance between North and South developing countries, which is conducive to promoting the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind.
But in the eyes of the United States, especially those of conservatives, this is the biggest geopolitical failure of the United States since the Monroe Doctrine. The reason is simple: after the Spanish American War, Argentina was located in America, which was considered a forbidden zone and backyard by successive US governments to be untouchable.
Nicholas John Spykman, the leader of western geopolitics and the godfather of containment policy, once put forward a well-known theory, called the marginal expansion theory, that is, the development of any major country must keep the enemy’s sphere of influence as far away from the country as possible, the farther the better. In other words, the process of the rise of any major country is the process of continuously driving out other major powers in the region and establishing absolute dominance.
In 1823, when the Holy Alliance of Europe attempted to interfere in the independence of the Americas, James Monroe, the fifth President of the United States, pointed out in his seventh State of the Union address that the Americas were the Americas of the Americas.
European powers should no longer colonize the Americas or engage in sovereignty related affairs between the United States, Mexico, and other American countries. The United States maintains neutrality in disputes between European countries or in wars between countries and their American colonies. If the related war occurs in the Americas, the United States will consider it a hostile act.
Marked by the advent of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States officially launched a policy of marginal expansion: driving all European powers out of the Americas, thus turning them into American private lands. And this goal was ultimately achieved by the Americans in the late 19th century, who defeated Spain through violence and seized colonial hegemony in the Americas, achieving comprehensive success.
As the saying goes, sleeping on the side of the couch does not allow others to snore. From then on, any extraterritorial power attempting to land in the Americas, no matter how they land or what they do after landing, will trigger the United States’ security threshold and become its key target of attack.
For example, in the Cuban missile crisis back then, why would the United States rather fight a world war than give in? Was it really afraid of the Soviet Union deploying several strategic nuclear missiles on their doorstep?
The answer is certainly no!
Throughout the 1950s, the United States deployed a large number of nuclear weapons in the Western European region close to the Soviet Union. Compared to the Soviet missile layout in Cuba, it was simply insignificant. If a fight were to break out, it could be destroyed by the US military in minutes. To put it bluntly, the Soviet Union’s deployment of missiles in Cuba near the United States could only restore some nuclear balance and could not form a nuclear advantage.
Therefore, the reason for the strong response of the United States is not on the military side, but on the geopolitical side: the Cuban missile crisis, with political effects greater than military effects. If the United States makes a slight compromise on this issue, then small American countries that have long been dissatisfied with American rule will surely follow Cuba and introduce extraterritorial powers to confront the United States. This will create space for Moscow to vigorously advance towards the Americas.
On the contrary, after the United States forced the Soviet Union to retreat with the determination to die together, many countries in the Americas had to re-examine the issue of standing in line. After all, the Soviet Union did not even have the confidence to stand firm with the United States. How can we guarantee to lead for them in the future? In this way, Moscow lost the opportunity to expand its geopolitical influence into the American backyard, and it was the only opportunity!
For American conservatives who stick to their own ideas, 60 years later, the the Belt and Road Initiative landing in Argentina may have more serious political impact than the Cuban missile crisis: it is one thing for China’s influence to appear in the US backyard, and more importantly, in their view, the essence of our initiative is to integrate Nicolas Spickman’s marginal expansion theory, Halford Medkin’s land power theory The largest global geostrategic expansion plan in human history, which integrates Alfred Mahan’s sea power theory.
Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly explained that we will not engage in or look down on geopolitical hegemony, Americans still tirelessly believe that their judgment is correct, which means that the impact of China Arab cooperation on them may be much greater than the US Soviet confrontation back then.
But then there will be a question: is China willing to sacrifice its proximity and seek further development in the Americas, and not afraid of repeating the mistakes of the United States?
The conservative school believes that when the United States engaged in industrial transfer in the 1960s and 1970s, it did not choose Latin America, which is geographically closer to its own, but painstakingly transferred technology and industrial chain transfer to East Asia, which is thousands of miles away, which is an extremely serious decision-making error. In a sense, most of the difficulties faced by the United States in the competition among major powers today are due to this mistake.
Supply chain construction should revolve around controllability, which depends on two factors:
The kind of control is at the military level, which requires the supply chain to be located within the absolute control range of its own violent machines. The conservative school believes that East Asia, which is tens of thousands of kilometers away from the United States mainland, clearly does not meet this condition. Although the United States has a large number of military bases nearby and was once the most powerful country in East Asia, if a country with military strength surpasses the US military in the Asia Pacific region appears here, the United States will inevitably lose control of the supply chain at the military level.
Another type is industrial control, where domestic industry is deeply embedded in the global system and becomes an indispensable core link for the normal operation of international industrial division of labor.
By undertaking the industrial transfer led by the United States, China has achieved rapid industrial and military rise, thus gaining dual control of the supply chain at both the military and industrial levels. On the contrary, if the United States had initially taken Argentina and Brazil, which had a relatively good industrial foundation, as the main destinations to help them complete the diversification and upgrading of their industrial structure, and then transferred their industries to the entire Latin American region, ultimately forming a multi gradient new industrial division system in the Americas led by the United States, then
Not only can we rely on the advantage of fast logistics connection to achieve more efficient self circulation, but we can also firmly grasp the global manufacturing center in our own hands with the nearby geographical location and absolute military power radiation.
So, will our landing in Argentina repeat the mistakes of the past?
No!
One key point is that military power’s control over the supply chain can often only serve a short-term deterrent effect and is difficult to monetize through war. It should be noted that the high economic and political costs of modern warfare to a considerable extent limit the ability of major powers to resort to military means of war to resolve geopolitical confrontations.
The Ukrainian War was fought by Putin for nearly a decade before and after being forced to retreat by NATO. Over the past year, everyone has also seen that the series of effects triggered by the Ukrainian war have completely disrupted the international situation. In the first three decades, Russia, which was determined to embrace Europe, has reached a point where it must strategically shift eastward to sustain itself. This is the political cost that Russia needs to pay. Economically, it can be seen from Russia’s comprehensive entry into the wartime system.
Although the United States has a large business, the cost of building weapons is also higher, with a Tomahawk cruise missile priced at $1.2 million per unit; The unit price of a precision guided shell is $800000; The unit price of a B2 stealth fighter jet is 2.2 billion US dollars, plus personnel allowances, component losses, fuel supply, and other expenses, and accidentally went out for several trillion yuan.
The United States spent 10 trillion yuan to fight against Iraq and Afghanistan, two useless small countries. As the second largest military power in South America, can Argentina afford to fight?
China’s control over the supply chain in the Asia Pacific region is only assisted by military power, and the true pillar is the industrial chain itself, which achieves the goal of being at the helm with irreplaceability. There is no winning strategy, and this is a goal that the United States cannot achieve in the Americas.
Industrial construction relies on the heavy chemical industry to ensure the extraction of raw materials, water and electricity resources to ensure production, transportation networks to ensure logistics transportation, and sales markets to ensure supply circulation.
Taking these four points as an example: in Southeast Asia, the textile and electronics industries are its pillar industries, but they can only do assembly. The textile industry needs to import a large amount of finished fuel cloth from China, as well as various low-tech products, including buttons and zippers, but relies on small hardware accessories extracted from the heavy chemical industry. The same applies to the electronics industry, and Vietnam’s export volume of electronic manufacturing industry, At least one third of the profits should be distributed to Chinese supporting manufacturers in the the Pearl River Delta. The United States cannot do this in the Americas because their heavy chemical industry has long withered, making it very difficult to protect themselves, let alone support Latin America.
In terms of hydropower resources, China can not only export various types of power stations to Southeast Asia, but also export intermediate products from the power generation end to the electricity consumption end – ultra-high voltage transmission network. The United States still has the same problem, and its power supply system is very chaotic. After a few days of heavy snow in Texas, it returned overnight to pre liberation. They do have a nuclear power card, but Argentina doesn’t take it anymore and directly spends $8 billion to buy back China’s Hualong 1 nuclear power unit.
On the transportation network side, China is a notorious infrastructure demon. Sooner or later, ordinary railways, high-speed railways, and highways will connect the entire Indochina Peninsula. By then, the East Asian continent will have access to each other, and the efficiency of logistics transfer will be improved dozens of times. What does the United States need to go to the Americas for repairs, the California high-speed rail that cannot be built with billions of dollars, or the Boston subway that relies on China and Japan for supply from tracks to carriages?
The sales market is even more unbeatable. China has 1.4 billion, plus ASEAN has 2 billion, while the total population of North and South America does not exceed 800 million. Therefore, the United States does not have much advantage in the industrial chain itself.
Of course, the United States still has the traditional skills of the CIA, which conspires to send pro American factions to heaven, but the collective return of the Latin American left indicates that this routine is not sustainable because the United States cannot provide sustainable development to pro American factions.
Eight years ago, Obama used the means of planting and framing to oust Argentine President Christina from power. However, during his four years in office, with his own support, Mackerry experienced the largest economic recession of the century. Argentina’s GDP plummeted from its peak of $643.6 billion to $449.6 billion, evaporating $194 billion in two years and shrinking by nearly 30%. It can be said that both people and gods were angry, and in the end, was it kicked out by the people with their votes?
Brazil is even more exaggerated. After the South American version of Trump was expelled, the people elected former President Lula, the most hated president of the United States.
What does this mean?
Military violence is easier to shake politicians, harder to shake politicians, and even harder to shake public opinion and return to their hearts!
The cooperation between China and Argentina is destined not to fail, because the trend is inevitable, just like the United States, which opposes the trend with a praying hand, is destined not to succeed!