Author: Sheng Tang rushong source wechat official account: the chief shopkeeper’s knife has been authorized to reprint
More than three months ago, the Nepalese government and the United States signed the Millennium Bug challenge plan agreement [MCC]. See my book: [Nepal’s equine worm]. The U.S. government once again offered 500million dollars to sign the Nepal security agreement [spp] with Nepal. That is to say, as long as Nigeria signs this agreement, it can get another 500million US dollars. And the money is for the Nepalese Army.
Compared with MCC, which has a majority of non-governmental cooperation, this spp directly refers to military cooperation. If the Nepalese side signs this agreement, the US National Guard can directly enter Nepal. Although the number is not very large, for a small country like Nepal, hundreds of heavily armed U.S. pot heads can accomplish most of the military purposes the U.S. government wants to adopt against Nepal. This is not alarmist. A capable operational team, coupled with the cooperation of the domestic armed forces of the target country, can basically succeed in everything. This is why we often see that someone from an African country can easily launch a military coup after gilding military barracks in Europe and the United States, and send himself from a school level officer to the presidency.
As for spp, the Nepalese government considered it again and again but refused. In fact, this is not surprising. In my opinion, the main reason why the Nepalese government wants MCC and refuses spp is the game between the government and the military. You know, the $500million in the spp is basically for the military, which is very different from the $500million in the MCC that is used by the government. The government naturally hesitates about such a sum. Of course, there are also public opposition factors. But didn’t Nepalese people also oppose MCC more than three months ago?
The domestic game is not the focus, but the diplomatic means of small countries. The reason why the Nepalese government wants MCC but refuses spp is a typical diplomatic means of small countries. Nepal can swallow the bait that is not harmful. Even a little blood is worth it. But for spp, which is a very harmful bait directly related to military security. Nepal naturally has to avoid it. [of course, if there are powerful factions in the military, there will be a rift, which will lead to domestic political instability. We can see the political chaos in Myanmar in the past two years.]
Nepal’s significance to China does not lie in security, but in the channel role between China and India. The future development potential between China and India is huge, and Nepal is one of the factors that cannot be bypassed. I think the reason why the United States has suddenly targeted Nepal in the past two years is probably due to this consideration. If we can control Nepal, we can upset the possible high level of cooperation between China and India in the future. This is called taking the lead in chess. Of course, it is also in line with the overall layout of the current U.S. Indo Pacific strategy. At present, the United States has laid a son in Nepal, and there will certainly be more means in the future. But there is a problem here. The layout of the United States is always beyond the reach of the whip. The influence of China and India on Nepal is absolutely unmatched by the United States. Even if one day, the United States launched a subversive action in Nepal, India will be the first to rush. If this results, the United States might as well not do it, because it is a typical act of making wedding clothes for others. Therefore, even if the United States plays tricks in Nepal, it can only make some small moves. This is also the reason why the Nepalese government does not reject the American bait, but selectively eats some of it.
There is an essential difference between the diplomacy of a small country and that of a big country. Small countries can abandon some principled things and wander among big countries. However, the great powers should never give up their principled interests in exchange for temporary stability. Because the interest game between big countries is fierce and cruel. Once you give up your principled interests and want to come back, it will be very difficult. Even you can achieve your goal by means of war. For example, our bottom line for the Taiwan Strait and the U.S. bottom line for the dollar are our own core interests. Once we let go, they will be swallowed up.
But for small countries. But don’t worry so much. For example, the Philippine military garrison agreement with the United States, some super national treatment of the U.S. military in the Philippines, and so on. Such a thing is unacceptable if it is put on a big country. We cannot allow the United States to station troops in Taiwan. Naturally, the United States will not welcome us to camp in Hawaii. However, the Philippines can take advantage of the changes in the Asian situation and the transfer of the strategic center of the United States to propose to the United States to terminate or continue these garrison agreements. The reason why these garrison agreements have not been completely broken is that the situation in Asia has not been absolutely reversed. The reason why the US garrison of Japan and South Korea is becoming more and more important is that the strategic focus of the United States has shifted back to the Asia Pacific region. Relatively speaking, the Philippines is not as important as Japan and South Korea in the East Asia strategy of the United States, so the Philippines can loosen its ties when the strategic focus of the United States shifts. However, Japan and South Korea have always been the strategic focus of the United States, and they cannot untie them [they do not want to untie them]. The deregulation of Japan and South Korea ultimately depends on the outcome of the game between China and the United States in the Asia Pacific region.
In other words, the diplomatic choice of a small country is actually dependent on the strength of a large country. Smart small governments will follow the trend and take advantage of the opportunity to make some profits, while unwise small governments will suffer enough because of the singleness of choice. This contrast is particularly vividly reflected in Philippine President duterte and former president Aquino III.
Some of us say that duterte has always been said to be a pro China faction, but I have already said that he is not. He is just a current affairs person. He is pro Philippines. From Aquino III, anyone can see that unilateral pro american and anti Chinese will not work. Because the Philippines’ economic dependence on China is too high. More importantly, the Philippines has no resistance to China’s punishment. Bananas are not all trifles. No one can stand building an island quickly. The more hostile Aquino III was to China, the more and faster the island was built. How can a politician like duterte, who has a lot of Jianghu habits, fail to see the reason. Therefore, it is the best policy to improve relations with China and make China feel embarrassed to continue building islands.
But duterte did not exclude the United States because of his pro China image. In the negotiation of the garrison agreement with the United States, it was also delayed again and again. Today, it said to terminate, and tomorrow, it said to continue. Anyway, I just don’t want to offend people completely. After much talk, his term of office will come. The oil and gas cooperation agreement with China has been discussed since 2018. A few days ago, duterte announced that the agreement would not be discussed any more. You see, the smart and quaint duterte used the core pursuit of China and the United States as a bargaining chip to spend his entire presidential term safely and comfortably, which brought a lot of benefits to the Philippines. But in fact, the promotion of these two events is about equal to stopping at the same place.
Are we to blame duterte for being slippery? It is not necessary at all, because in the current situation of the Philippines, in-depth cooperation between China and the Philippines is also very difficult, just as it is difficult for the Philippines to completely abolish the US garrison agreement. The reason is very simple. Looking at the history of the Philippines, we can see that the Philippines was once a colony of the United States. It used to be one of the largest garrisons of the United States in Southeast Asia. Domestic politicians and military generals are branded with a deep American mark. It is absolutely an impossible task to make a complete unilateral pro China choice in the Philippines. From Aquino III, we can at least see that his unilateral choice of the United States has become impossible. Is this not a progress for China? A victory?
Therefore, we can’t blame people for reneging on certain agreements with duterte, a political means of Jianghu habits. When he was doing these things, he didn’t think there would be a result. What he needed was to bring benefits to himself and the Philippines. To be able to do this and be so pragmatic, in fact, he is already a smart and sizing up the situation politician.
Moreover, the new Philippine President Marcos Jr. is the successor recognized by duterte, and duterte’s daughter will also become an important member of the future Philippine government as vice president. In this case, he naturally wants to leave more political legacies to help little Marcos go more smoothly in the future. Therefore, he terminated the negotiation of China Philippines oil and gas cooperation agreement.
We have all had this experience before. Whenever a political figure in a country is replaced, it will terminate or change some of China’s agreements. This is true of Malaysia, Greece and Sri Lanka. Why does this happen? It is not that the newly elected people do not need these agreements or are unfriendly to China, but that they need to turn these agreements into their own political and diplomatic chips. Therefore, generally speaking, they will abolish or terminate them after coming up, and then reopen them. Such a diplomatic chip originally belonging to the former government will naturally become the diplomatic chip of the new government. Duterte just did such things to offend people first, and then let little Marcos and his daughter gain more active chips in their exchanges with China after the formal establishment of the new government. He did the things that offended people first, and then let the new government do better.
From the perspective of the Chinese people, we are a little annoyed about this practice, but from the perspective of the Filipinos, duterte is a model, and duterte is a political figure in the Philippines. Naturally, we can’t blame him for doing such a thing. We can only admire him for his slick means and his mind of helping a horse to get a ride.
The diplomatic attitude of small countries depends on the strength of large countries. With this in mind, we can understand the incomprehensible things that some small countries do. Next, we need to pay attention to what little Marcos will do in the overall China policy. As for some of the things he will do when he comes up, we need to understand that it is just a means for small countries to wander between big countries. As long as he is not as completely unilateral and pro american as Aquino III, what we need to do is to make ourselves stronger and let small countries have more confidence in choosing us.
The clouds are rolling and comfortable, and the posture is myriad. What we need to pay attention to is not the thousands of good-looking gestures, but whether it will bring about a spring rain as expensive as oil.