Exquisite and breathtaking: the century game between China, the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962!

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I. snow and winter clouds: China encountered great difficulties in its internal affairs and diplomacy in the 1960s

From 1959 to 1961, serious difficulties occurred in China’s domestic economy. Grain was 287billion Jin in 1960. 103billion Jin less than 390billion Jin in 1957, lower than the level in 1952; In 1960, cotton production was 16million tons, a decrease of 16.8 million tons from 32.8 million tons in 1957. Although steel production reached 18.6 million tons in 1960, an increase of 1330 tons from 5.3 million tons in 1957, it soon fell to 8.7 million tons in 1961, a decrease of 9.6 million tons from 1960. The economic difficulties in industry and agriculture have aggravated the shortage of market supply. Grain consumption fell from 406 Jin per capita in 1957 to 372 Jin in 1960, a decrease of 79 Jin. The consumption of cotton and knitwear also decreased significantly. Food, clothing and materials are insufficient, and the actual living standard of employees has decreased by about 30%. [1]

In 1961, China’s total industrial and agricultural output value was 162.1 billion yuan, a decrease of 31% over the previous year. Among them, the total industrial output value was 106.2 billion yuan, a decrease of 38.2% over the previous year; The total agricultural output value was 55.9 billion yuan, a decrease of 2.4% over the previous year. The output of major industrial and agricultural products: steel, 8.7 million tons, a decrease of 53.2% over the previous year; Coal, 278million tons, a decrease of 30% over the previous year; Power generation, 48billion kwh, decreased by 19.2% over the previous year. Grain, 147.5 million tons, an increase of 2.8% over the previous year; Cotton, 800000 tons, a decrease of 24.7% over the previous year; Oilseeds, 1.814 million tons, a decrease of 6.5% over the previous year. The total investment in capital construction was 12.742 billion yuan, a decrease of 67.2% over the previous year. The total retail sales of social goods was 60.77 billion yuan, a decrease of 12.8% over the previous year. The total revenue of the state is 35.61 billion yuan, the total expenditure is 36.7 billion yuan, and the deficit is 1.09 billion yuan. [2]

In 1962, the agricultural situation in China improved slightly. The total industrial and agricultural output value of that year was 150.4 billion yuan (calculated at constant prices in 1957, the same below), a decrease of 10.1% over the previous year. Among them, the total industrial output value was 92billion yuan, a decrease of 16.6% over the previous year; The total agricultural output value was 58.4 billion yuan, an increase of 6.2% over the previous year. The output of major industrial and agricultural products: 6.67 million tons of steel, a decrease of 23.3% over the previous year; Coal, 22million tons, a decrease of 20.9% over the previous year; Power generation, 45.8 billion kwh, a decrease of 4.6% over the previous year; Grain, 160 million tons, an increase of 8.5% over the previous year; Cotton, 750000 tons, a decrease of 6.2% over the previous year; Oilseeds, 2.03 million tons, an increase of 10.5% over the previous year. The total investment in capital construction was 7.126 billion yuan, a decrease of 44.1% over the previous year. The total retail sales of social goods was 60.4 billion yuan, a decrease of 0.6% over the previous year. The total revenue of the state is 31.36 billion yuan, the total expenditure is 30.53 billion yuan, and the balance is 830 million yuan. [3]

More seriously, the serious shortage of consumer goods has led to an increase in the number of abnormal deaths. The most difficult provinces in the three-year difficult period are Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Anhui and other provinces. “Among these provinces, Anhui may have the most serious population reduction.” [4]

On March 19, 1959, in response to the preparation of the “counter offensive plan” by Taiwan’s Kuomintang, an armed rebellion occurred in Tibet, China, and the Dalai Lama fled to India. On April 27, Indian Prime Minister Nehru delivered a speech on the situation in Tibet at the people’s assembly, advocating the convening of the so-called “round table” of New Delhi, Beijing and Lhasa.

The relations between the two parties and the two countries have seriously deteriorated.

From January 3 to 21, 1959, Michael young, the first vice chairman of the Soviet Council of ministers, met with US President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon and Secretary of State Dulles during his vacation in the United States. From January 27 to February 5, the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held, declaring that the practical possibility of excluding World War from social life had emerged. In June, the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the new national defense technology agreement signed by China and the Soviet Union in 1957, refusing to provide China with samples of atomic bombs and technical materials for the production of atomic bombs. At the same time, the military friction between China and India is increasing day by day. On September 9, TASS issued a statement on the armed conflict on the border between China and India, publicly favoring India, and then gave India a loan of 1.5 billion rubles. On September 15, Khrushchev visited the United States and held talks with Eisenhower to promote the policy of Soviet American cooperation to jointly dominate the world. From September 30 to October 2, Khrushchev visited Beijing and accused the Communist Party of China of interfering in China’s internal affairs. Relations between the two parties and the two countries have deteriorated. Since July, 1960, the Soviet Union has been constantly picking fights on the Sino Soviet border. In 1961, when China’s economy was in the most difficult period, the Soviet Union asked China to repay the loan of Soviet military supplies to China during the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea with the principal and interest. In April and may 1962, the Soviet authorities lured and coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into the territory of the Soviet Union in Ili and Tacheng regions through their institutions and personnel in Xinjiang, China. On October 20, the Indian army launched a large-scale all-round attack on Chinese territory from the south, and China was forced to fight back in self-defense. Since then, China India relations have deteriorated in an all-round way. Since 1963, the Soviet Union has massively increased its troops on the Sino Soviet border, creating new military pressure on Northern Xinjiang of China. If we take into account the southeast, Chiang Kai Shek also took advantage of China’s domestic and diplomatic difficulties to actively prepare his “plan to counterattack the mainland”. China’s security from the southeast, southwest and North suddenly formed a resonant deterioration situation. [5] In his book, American scholar Fei Zhengqing said, “in Beijing’s view, integration became a coordinated threat in the summer of 1962.” [6] The people’s Republic of China is in a difficult situation of “thousands of flowers wither for a while” [7].

In terms of diplomacy, in 1962, new China was also surrounded by dangers.

In the southwest, on April 21 and 30, 1962, the Chinese government sent two notes to the Indian government, strongly protesting the Indian army’s continuous invasion of China’s Xinjiang region and the establishment of new military strongholds. From May 11 to 28, Indian troops continued to invade Western Tibet and the eastern Langjiu region of China, and added military strongholds in China. The Chinese government met with the Indian government on the 11th, 19th and 28th to lodge a serious protest. On July 22, the Chinese government made a strong protest to India over the Indian army’s invasion of the qipucha River Valley in Xinjiang, China, and the armed attack on Chinese border posts. From September 13 to 27, the Indian Army crossed the “McMahon line” again, set up a military stronghold in the eastern part of Tibet, China, and continued to fire on Chinese border troops, killing and injuring many Chinese border soldiers. On September 21, the Chinese government lodged a strong protest with the Indian government.

In the southeast, the US Australia new treaty organization held a Ministerial Council in Canberra and decided to send troops to Thailand to exert military pressure on Vietnam and Laos. On May 15, US President Kennedy ordered 5000 Marines to be sent to Thailand. In coordination with it, Chiang Kai Shek in Taiwan also deployed troops and generals to actively prepare for the “counterattack against the mainland”.

In the northwest, from April to may, the Soviet Union also took advantage of the difficult situation of China’s domestic economy and lured and coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into the territory of the Soviet Union through its institutions and personnel stationed in Xinjiang, China.

This forced the Chinese government, which was experiencing economic difficulties, to put the military struggle, especially the military self-defense counterattack in the southwest, on the agenda, and decided that after the climate improved in April, the Xinjiang army of the Chinese people’s Liberation Army would resume patrolling the western border line and re-establish some outposts. In addition, according to the instructions of the Central Committee, the Chinese border defense force consists of Zhang Guohua, commander of the Tibet Military Region, Deng Shaodong and Zhao Wenjin, deputy commanders, and Lu Yishan, deputy political commissar; Tan Guansan, political commissar of the Tibet Military Region, Chen Mingyi, deputy commander, Zhan Huayu, deputy political commissar, and Wang Kang, chief of staff, presided over the work at the Lhasa command post. The Xinjiang border defense forces formed the western section headquarters headed by hejiachan, commander of the southern Xinjiang Military Region. Facing the aggressive offensive of India, the southwest war is imminent.


II. Mao Zedong built the “plank road” in the southeast Ming Dynasty, and the United States immediately exerted pressure on Jiang

In order to ensure the victory of the self-defense war on the western front, the CPC Central Committee increased its troops in the Southeast Taiwan Strait. Mao Zedong’s military mobilization, which was only used to sow discord, immediately made the United States nervous, believing that it was “the largest military mobilization of this type since the Korean War”. [8] On June 18, 1962, the director of the Bureau of intelligence and research Hillman wrote a report to Secretary of state Rusk on “the mobilization of the Communist Party of China’s troops”, asking the Secretary of state to “take seriously the intentions of the Communist Party of China”, saying that “it cannot be ruled out that the Communist Party of China is preparing for the sudden and all-out capture of Kinmen or Mazu, or both, probably using equipment they did not have in 1958”. [9] At the same time, the report believes that this will aggravate the contradiction between the United States and Chiang Kai Shek again:

The military build-up of the Communist Party of China opposite Kinmen and Mazu not only focused on the coastal islands themselves, but also on Chiang Kai Shek’s intention to “counter attack” the mainland. A direct conflict of interest between the United States and the Chinese Kuomintang seems very likely. If the Chinese Communists attack, the United States will face pressure from Chiang Kai Shek, his friends in Southeast Asia and his friends here in the United States, who ask the United States to participate in defending these islands. This will immediately require a decision on whether this attack is the initial action to attack Formosa, as detailed in the Formosa resolution, and Jiang will undoubtedly publish all kinds of “intelligence” intended to indicate such an attack.

If the CPC did not actually attack, but created a 1958 style political military crisis, the situation would be slightly better. Chiang’s demands will be urgent, and if the support of the United States is not forthcoming, these demands will undoubtedly become open and harsh.

The Chinese Communist Party has important motives to worsen the relationship between the United States and the Chinese Kuomintang, and may start doing so at any time. On the other hand, Jiang always made it one of his priority goals to involve the United States in reconquering the mainland. Once the Chinese Communist Party is in place, Jiang may provoke an attack or take the initiative to take advantage of the situation for his own purposes in other ways.

Therefore, once the troops in Peiping are fully in place, the initiative seems to be in the hands of the Chinese, either the Communist Party or the Kuomintang. If it is necessary to take preventive or interventional actions to safeguard the interests of the United States, it seems that such actions may be a realistic choice only in a very limited time. [10]

Looking back now, Mao Zedong’s deployment of troops to the southeast is just a “false swaying” action to prepare for the military struggle in the southwest. On June 19, the day after receiving Hillman’s report, the U.S. State Department called the “ambassador” to Taiwan and “made an appointment with” Chiang Kai Shek as soon as possible to remind him, “there are signs of a large-scale build-up of the Chinese Communist army in Fujian”, which “has a very realistic possibility: the Chinese Communist Party intends to launch a comprehensive attack on some islands”; At the same time, he also asked Chiang Kai Shek: “in this case, the most important thing is that the government of the Republic of China cannot provide any excuse for this attack with any public statements made by government officials of the Republic of China or with any actions of the government of the Republic of China”. [11]

The large-scale military mobilization of the mainland in Southeast Fujian Province made the United States jittery, and all departments were as busy as ants on the hot pot, but they still couldn’t understand the intentions of the Communist Party of China.

To this end, on June 20, the White House held a meeting, and Defense Secretary McNamara was angry, “the statement shows contempt for intelligence agencies”. McNamara said, “we have to start working on intelligence; there is no intelligence”, and he “hinted that the CIA was doing a bad job”. [12]

On June 21, the CIA invited Eisenhower to listen to the former president’s judgment on the “large-scale military assembly of the Communist Party of China in Fujian Province”. General Eisenhower speculated that the rally was a response to Kuomintang propaganda. Ai Shi told director McCann in an expert tone: “the deployment of the Chinese Communist army in Fujian Province will show whether they want to attack or defend. The defensive formation should be distributed along the coast, and the reserves should be fanned out in the rear echelon. The offensive formation is a large number of troops gathered near the target.” [13] Ai Shi also introduced his Taiwan policy when he was in office and some practices in the 1958 Taiwan Strait conflict. On the same day (June 21), Acting Secretary of State Powell called President Kennedy to put forward “the proposed diplomatic action related to the military build-up of the Communist Party of China”, the first of which was to “hint” Soviet ambassador to the United States Brenin, “if the Soviets or the Communist Party of China feel uneasy about the rumors that the Chinese Kuomintang is preparing to invade the mainland, the United States has no intention to support such an action under the current circumstances”; It was emphasized to them that “the Chinese Kuomintang has agreed not to take any offensive action without full consultation and the prior consent of the United States” to reassure the Soviet Union and Chinese Mainland. [14] Also on the same day (June 21), the director of the Bureau of intelligence and research Hillman told the assistant secretary of state for Far East affairs Harriman that the United States’ military mobilization to the mainland “under the current circumstances, it is obviously disadvantageous for the United States to make any firm decision to defend the coastal Islands”. [15] On the same day (June 21), Nietzsche, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, wrote to Mazi, deputy secretary of state for political affairs, and further stated, “we recognize that there are some convincing reasons to support a policy of seeking the eventual voluntary withdrawal of the government of the Republic of China from coastal islands.” [16]

On June 22, Acting Secretary of state Harriman summoned the British ambassador and told him that the United States “did not know whether the Chinese communist military build-up in Fujian was offensive or defensive”; It is hoped that the British people will help “inform Peiping as soon as possible”, “the US government has no intention of supporting such an attack under the current circumstances in connection with the rumors that the government of the Republic of China plans to attack the mainland”. [17] On the same day (June 22), the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong called the State Council to submit an analysis report, believing that there are four possibilities for the military mobilization of the Chinese mainland, and there are two results in each possibility, and its conclusion is unclear. [18]

On June 23, Cabot, the US Warsaw negotiator with China, told Wang Bingnan that under the current circumstances, the United States would not support Chiang Kai Shek’s attack on the mainland. Cabot has repeatedly said that the United States does not want to see another world war. He even said to Wang Bingnan, “if Chiang Kai Shek wants to act, our two countries will unite to stop him.” [19]

On June 24, U.S. Secretary of state Rusk visited Britain and held talks with the British Prime Minister. Rusk first talked about China’s military build-up opposite Taiwan, and “he can assure Britain that Peiping knows that the United States will not allow an attack on the mainland” [20]. British Prime Minister Macmillan criticized the U.S. policy towards China with “fierce words”. Macmillan said that he “simply did not understand the U.S. policy towards China”, and the United States “did not even recognize the existence of China”. He said that he did not know the “long-term policy” of the United States. Macmillan believed that “this cannot be justified by any logic”. He said that “the Peiping regime clearly represents China”, and the United States actually let “a guy from Taiwan” sit on China’s seat in the United Nations. [21]

On the same day (June 24), China’s “people’s Daily” published a telegraphic version of “the army and the people across the country should be vigilant and prepare to smash the military adventures of Chiang Kai Shek’s gangs”, which was personally approved by Mao Zedong, exposing Chiang Kai Shek’s conspiracy to “counter attack the mainland”, and also testing the bottom line of U.S. support for Chiang Kai Shek.

Rusk seemed to have “peace of mind” from the article in the people’s daily. At this time, he wanted to get closer to China. On June 25, the United States and Britain continued their talks. Rusk said, “the Peiping authorities broadcast an article describing these measures as defensive”; This is also confirmed by the US intelligence and the analysis report on the deployment of the Chinese air force on the mainland. Then Rusk said that the United States planned to provide food aid to Chinese Mainland. He said, “we don’t foresee how much impact food can have on China’s general situation from the outside,” but “in any case, we don’t rule out the possibility of participating in some general humanitarian action”. [22] the US military could not read the contents of the article of China’s Xinhua News Agency on June 24, so that on the day Rusk wanted to improve relations with the Communist Party of China in Britain (June 25), the Joint Chiefs of staff said that “the US government should be prepared for the use of nuclear weapons” [23].

On June 27, US President Kennedy issued a statement on the situation in the Taiwan Strait, saying that he would not support Chiang Kai Shek’s attack on Chinese Mainland. On June 28, the US State Department sent a message to the “embassy” in Taiwan, asking them to convey the “strong desire” of the US President Chiang Kai Shek, “that is, it is crucial for the US and Taiwan governments to avoid showing signs that they are planning to attack the mainland at this time”. [24]

On July 2, Khrushchev delivered a speech, strongly condemning the United States’ support for the provocation of the Chiang Kai Shek authorities against the Chinese Mainland, saying that the Chinese people would receive the firm support of the socialist camp.

On July 4, Kirk, the “ambassador” of the United States to Taiwan, called the State Department and said that he had passed on Kennedy’s idea to Chiang Kai Shek, who had “guaranteed that Taiwan would not first launch any action against the mainland in Kinmen and Mazu”. When asked about Khrushchev’s speech, Jiang insisted that “the Soviet Union would not intervene”. [25] the next day (July 5), Chiang Kai Shek met with Kirk again and said, “I will go to the hospital in the afternoon and will not come out in the near future, so I want to make some additions to the talks on July 4.”. He once again stated to Kennedy, “he will not take any unilateral action, but will only cooperate more closely with the United States”, and make his policy consistent with the United States. He said that President Kennedy was busy on business, and he “promised not to add new problems to the president”. [26]

Third, Mao Zedong ignored it, and the United States and Chiang Kai Shek in the southeast are in the same situation; Chiang Kai Shek wants to “reconsider” the US Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty

Since July, the conflict on China’s southwest border has escalated day by day, and China’s preparations for war have become increasingly urgent.

On July 5, Indian troops invaded the kalevan River Valley, which is India’s access to aksaichin in China, and its strategic position is very important. On July 7 and 11, Zhou Enlai successively listened to the reports on the Sino Indian border and made a report to Mao Zedong. On July 14, the Central Military Commission sent the responsible comrades of the operation Department of the general staff to Xinjiang to convey the instructions of Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee on carrying out the anti encroachment struggle in the western section of the Sino Indian border to the Xinjiang Military Region and the border defense forces on the Western Line, and to give specific guidance to this struggle. Mao Zedong said, “we have every reason to fight India’s stationing in our territory, but now we should exercise restraint and not rush to fight.” [27]

At the same time, Mao Zedong was still making a big splash in the southeast, causing the United States and the Chiang Kai Shek authorities to fly like dogs, and the contradiction escalated.

On September 6, Kirk held talks with Chiang Kai Shek in Yangmingshan. Taiwan’s “foreign minister” Shen Changhuan and “director of information” Shen Jianhong participated in the talks. At the beginning of the talks, Chiang Kai Shek was strongly dissatisfied with the United States. Kirk first said, “the deployment of the Chinese Communist forces along the coast of Fujian seems to have been completed. The strength of these forces is much stronger than those deployed before June 1962. We believe that the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party is to defend, but we cannot rule out the possibility of attack.” [28] this statement itself contains complaints about Chiang Kai Shek’s counter offensive plan. Kirk then implicitly criticized the Chiang authorities for “not having reliable and timely information”, which made it “difficult for President Kennedy to make a correct decision”. [29]

Chiang Kai Shek immediately retorted: “Unless action is taken against the mainland, it is difficult to have the kind of ‘excellent’ intelligence required by the U.S. government. The national government still has many intelligence sources that have not been disclosed to the United States. Even if told to the United States, the United States will not recognize their value. Many intelligence sources are based on verbal agreements. Before the action is launched, people cannot know, see or find out these intelligence sources.” [30] Kirk said: “the U.S. government still hopes that the action is best limited to small-scale airborne.” Jiang responded, “we’ll talk about it later.” [31] Jiang was so full of “resentment” against the United States that he wanted to “reconsider” the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan. He said:

The U.S. government must also recognize the importance of the feelings between the people and the military. The wishes of the people on the mainland are extremely strong, and they cannot be rejected indefinitely. They yearned for liberation, especially with the assistance of the United States. The United States can suppress this feeling for a while, but not for long. The U.S. government can publicly declare that the return of the national government to the mainland is an internal affair of the Chinese people. In fact, the US government assumed the responsibility of preventing the Nationalist government from counter attacking the mainland. This cannot continue indefinitely. Ultimately, it is very difficult for any government to maintain control of the situation. The national government will abide by the treaty, but when the situation changes, it must reconsider the treaty. [32]

Kirk said: the treaty issues raised by Jiang have gone beyond the scope of the ambassador’s functions and powers. If you are not satisfied with the terms, perhaps Taiwan’s “ambassador” can put it forward in Washington. Chiang Kai Shek immediately retorted:

Talking about the treaty is because Ambassador Kirk raised the issue of the treaty. It is one thing to modify or cancel the treaty, and it is another thing to let the world know that the national government cannot move freely due to the limitation of the treaty. This did nothing good to the United States and caused resentment. If there is a large-scale riot in the mainland, the United States can say that it is an internal affair. In fact, the Americans let people know that under the restrictions of the treaty, the Taiwan government cannot attack the mainland without authorization. [33]

Kirk explained, “President Kennedy also has to shoulder heavy global responsibilities. Just as President Jiang is responsible to his people, President Kennedy is also responsible to the Chinese people. The 1954 treaty stipulates that both sides must act together.” Chiang Kai Shek immediately replied:

There is only one thing the president needs to do: announcing the national government’s counterattack against the mainland is entirely an internal matter. Such a statement, if not prevented, would weaken the open participation of the Soviet Union. He reiterated his pledge that he would not take actions in violation of the provisions, but he hoped that the U.S. government would take effective measures to help the national government fulfill its responsibilities to its people without violating the provisions of the treaty. The United States government must come up with such a solution.

Kirk thought that Chiang Kai Shek wanted arms support from the United States and said, “the United States is also responsible to NATO allies and other places. It is impossible to secretly transport bombers and landing craft to Taiwan. Such action will be regarded as an act of aggression.” Chiang Kai Shek responded tit for tat and full of gunpowder:

He did not envisage such equipment. What he wanted was to reach a broader understanding between Taiwan and the United States. The last thing the United States wants to see is the view that the United States is becoming a friend of the Communist Party of China but binding its allies. The United States should not let the Chinese people think that the United States cannot distinguish between enemies and friends. The United States even prevented the national government from using its own money to buy American exports. This is actually an embargo on the national government. He did not know whether an embargo had also been imposed on the enemy. [34]

On September 8, general Taylor, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, came to Taiwan for talks with Chiang Kai Shek. Based on the experience of dealing with the Soviet Union around 1948, Chiang Kai Shek clearly told Taylor: “in case of turmoil in the mainland, Khrushchev will not help Mao, because they have deep hatred for each other; even if the Communist Party’s rule in the south of the Yellow River is overthrown, the Soviet Union will not intervene.” [35] Taylor said in the document drafted on September 20 after returning home: “if we can’t frankly show the commander-in-chief what our intention is, instead of supporting him to counter attack the mainland, then we may be accumulating trouble for ourselves.” [36]


IV. Mao Zedong “knocked the mountain” in the southwest, and China’s self-defense counterattack against India rose and fell together with the US Soviet Cuban missile crisis

Beginning in September, 1962, the clouds of the Caribbean naval battle suddenly rose.

On September 2, the Soviet Union put its hand directly under the belly of the United States and announced that it had reached an agreement with Cuba on the supply of weapons and technical experts to Cuba. On September 4, Kennedy issued a policy statement on Cuba, saying that he would take military action against Cuba if necessary. On September 5 and 8, two Soviet cargo ships carrying a batch of medium-range ballistic missiles arrived in Havana. On September 12, TASS issued a statement of authorization condemning the United States’ deliberate invasion of Cuba and warning that invasion of Cuba means war. The next day (September 13), Kennedy made a tit for tat statement reiterating that as long as the security of the United States was threatened, the United States would take action. On September 25, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro announced that the Soviet Union would help Cuba establish a “fishing base” in Havana.

On the same day as Kennedy’s statement (September 13), the Indian army also began to cross the “McMahon line” on a large scale, set up military strongholds in the eastern part of Tibet, China, and constantly opened fire on Chinese border troops, killing and injuring many Chinese border soldiers. At this time, it was ripe for Mao Zedong to consider organizing the southwest self-defense counterattack campaign.

On October 16, Kennedy received verified and conclusive information that the United States found offensive missiles in Soviet ships bound for Cuba and immediately said that it must respond to this threat from Cuba and the missiles must be removed. To this end, the U.S. government held an emergency meeting. During the meeting, it was learned that at least 16 missiles, possibly 32 missiles with a range of more than 1000 miles, had been found, posing a major threat to the United States.

On October 16, the Central Military Commission seized the opportunity to quickly turn from the plan of “restraint now, no hurry to fight” in July to the decision of “shining the sword” in the Southwest: on October 17, the Central Military Commission issued the “battle order to annihilate the invading Indian army”.

On October 20, Kennedy decided to blockade Cuba, and the Cuban missile crisis broke out immediately.

At 7:30 a.m. on October 20, Zhang Guohua, commander of the Tibet Military Region, issued a combat order to fight back against India on the tagra ridge. Immediately, ten thousand artillery fired at the Chinese position, shaking the earth. At noon, they occupied the Indian army positions on the front of the kerjilang river. Less than three days after the battle, the seventh brigade of India’s ace army was completely destroyed. Brigadier John? Brigadier general darvey was captured on October 22. About 4000 people from three infantry battalions and an artillery brigade stationed south of the keranga River fled south immediately after learning that the seventh brigade was destroyed. On October 24, the Chinese people’s liberation army occupied dongxinqiao and entered Tawang on October 25. At the eastern end of the eastern section of the Sino Indian border, the Chinese Army crossed the McMahon line from the Qamdo, Nyingchi and Shannan army divisions, and attacked the Indian army from the Chayu and varong directions. All the five battalions of Indian troops stationed in this area fled. The Chinese Army successfully entered Corinthians, manifeng, xialingong and other places. In the western section of the Sino Indian border, under the command of commander he jiachan, the Chinese border defense army used only one multi regiment force to concentrate from north to south. After several days of continuous operations, nearly 300 Indian troops were destroyed, and then entered the rest. [37] on October 26, the president of India declared a “state of emergency” throughout the country.

At 2 p.m. on October 24, the United States Navy announced the blockade of Cuba. The United States has set up a cordon around Cuba’s territorial waters, and nearly 100 ships, escorted by the air force and aircraft carriers, have entered the cordon waters. At the same time, in Florida and neighboring states, the United States has assembled a strong landing force, eyeing covetously. On the same day (October 24), UN Secretary General Wu Dan proposed to the United States and the Soviet Union to stop arms shipments to Cuba for three weeks and suspend the embargo at the same time. On October 25, Khrushchev accepted Wu Dan’s proposal, while Kennedy reiterated the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. On the morning of October 26, the United States forcibly inspected the first Soviet chartered ship bound for Cuba. That night. Kennedy received a personal letter from Khrushchev, in which he admitted that Cuba had Soviet made missiles and said that he would never send weapons to Cuba again, and those already in Cuba could be removed and destroyed. But the next day (October 27), the United States received an official document from the Soviet Ministry of foreign affairs, and proposed that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey as a condition for the Soviet Union to withdraw Cuban missiles. On the same day (October 27), a U-2 plane was shot down by Cuba, and the pilot died. Kennedy issued an ultimatum to the Soviet Union: unless the Soviet Union guarantees to remove Cuban missiles within 24 hours, the United States will

Military operations. On October 28, Moscow Radio Broadcast Khrushchev’s reply that he agreed to withdraw the missiles. On November 8, Soviet ships transported missiles from Cuba and received “naked eye observation” by the U.S. Navy on the high seas. On November 20, Kennedy announced the final end of the blockade. On November 21, the Soviet Union also “lifted” the mobilization order for the army. So far, the Cuban missile crisis is over. [38]

On the same day (October 24) that UN Secretary General Wu Dan proposed to the United States and the Soviet Union to stop arms shipments to Cuba for three weeks and suspend the blockade, Zhou Enlai also proposed three ceasefire proposals to Nehru, which Nehru rejected. At the same time, India actively deployed two divisions and nine brigades to strengthen the border forces along the whole line. By early November, the Indian army was still under the command of the Fourth Army in the eastern section, and a second division was added, with a total of 22000 troops in two divisions and ten brigades, and a total of more than 8000 troops in the western section.

On November 14, six days before the end of the Cuban missile crisis, the Chinese army began the second round of counterattack. On the same day, the Indian army first launched an attack on the Chinese army, which was defeated. On November 16, three regiments of the Chinese army entered and occupied the town of varong. The commander of the Fourth Army of the Indian army, kauer, lost his troops in panic and fled by transport plane. The 11th brigade of the Indian Army led by him collapsed one after another. On the evening of November 19, Nehru delivered an emergency speech to the whole country, saying:

We have to tell you about the new setbacks. Two Chinese troops entered the northeast border special zone. We lost varong and xishankou. Today, bondila has lost. In the chushule region, China launched a fierce attack on us. The situation is serious and sad. [39]

Late at night on November 20, Nehru hurried to write a letter to U.S. President Kennedy, appealing for emergency military assistance from the United States. On November 21, when the Chinese pursuit force reached the traditional customary line between China and India, it was ordered to stop advancing. Just as India ordered the emergency evacuation of people from northeast States and the evacuation of overseas Chinese was in chaos, the Chinese government issued a statement at 0:00 on November 21, announcing that from 0:00 on November 22, the Chinese border defense forces would cease fire across the China India border. India neither accepted nor rejected it.

China announced a ceasefire only one day longer than the end of the Cuban missile crisis.


V. Mao Zedong “shocked the tiger” in the southeast, and the United States was more pessimistic about Chiang’s “counter offensive” plan

The Indian army’s nibbling attack on China’s border is a test of China’s “earthquake resistance”. The United States, the Soviet Union and even Taiwan Chiang Kai Shek are paying close attention to China’s response and its results. Therefore, the disastrous defeat of India has a great impact on the Taiwan policy of the United States.

During China’s counterattack against India, Chiang Kai Shek also launched a counterattack against the mainland at the same time. From October 1 to December 6, 1962, Chiang Kai Shek sent nine secret agents from Kaohsiung to sneak into Haifeng, Huiyang, Huilai, Dianbai and Taishan counties along the coast of Guangzhou. [40]

While Mao Zedong commanded the counterattack in the southwest of China, he also attacked Chiang Kai Shek cleanly and thoroughly in the southeast, making Chiang Kai Shek’s counterattack in the southeast lose everything. In a short period of two months from October 1 to December 6, 172 us and Chiang spies were annihilated, including seven “commanders” and 14 “Deputy commanders” of the spy column. Sank three motorboats carrying spies and seized a batch of American made radios, pistols, submachine guns, etc. All but one of the nine agents sent by Chiang Kai Shek did not dare to land were wiped out. [41] on September 11, 1963, when Jiang Jingguo visited Kennedy and was asked about “the success rate of recent harassment actions”, he also admitted: “as a military action, these harassment are not successful”; In response to the casualties, Jiang Jingguo admitted that “the casualty rate is 85%”. [42] although the figures provided by Jiang Jingguo are different from those provided by the mainland, it is a common fact that his counter offensive suffered a devastating failure.

Chiang Kai Shek’s disastrous landing escalated the grievances between the United States and Chiang Kai Shek. On February 4, 1963, when reporting to President Kennedy, Kirk, the U.S. ambassador to Taiwan, said: Chiang Kai Shek “blames the United States for its downfall. I don’t think he will be grateful to the United States one day when he returns to the mainland, and it will become very difficult to deal with”; “It’s hard for me to see the chairman, who is always perfunctory to me. I think I don’t understand the Chinese people and always use the treaty to make things difficult for him. I further said that the chairman sometimes requires visitors to indirectly pass the message to President Kennedy, which should have been passed by the American ambassador. This shows that the chairman can’t get along well with me, and he wants to bypass me in other ways. This is an old Chinese trick.” [43] when Kennedy learned about Chiang Kai Shek’s recent counter offensive “task force” that “all nine teams were captured”, he asked Kirk Chiang Kai Shek “what do you think of India? Can the Chinese Communist Party beat India?” Kirk said, “the chairman said that it is no problem for the Chinese Communist Party to have an advantage, and Indians can’t do anything.” [44] the implication of Kennedy’s words is: if “Indians can’t do anything”, then Chiang Kai Shek is even worse. Kirk said to Kennedy:

I myself strongly oppose giving President Chiang Kai Shek any leeway, no matter how he tries to bypass the treaty he signed with the United States.

A. I also think it is necessary to take steps to make Chiang Kai Shek understand that we will not participate. b. I believe that in the near future, we can appropriately make some public statements, that is, we do not intend to deviate from our publicly announced position that we will defend Taiwan, but we will not support the Chinese government in Taiwan to launch aggression. In my opinion, such a step is an acceptable method, which lies between (a) giving a strict warning not to do it with a short notice, or (b) using U.S. military forces to intervene once the commander-in-chief has started the invasion. [45]

It is worth noting that the difference between Kirk’s proposal and the past is that the object of “using U.S. military power to intervene” is no longer Chinese Mainland but Taiwan Chiang Kai Shek. This shows that after the Sino Indian War, the United States had contempt and impatience for Taiwan’s “counter offensive plan”. In fact, since the end of 1962, Mao Zedong’s “bright sword” in the Southwest has not only made the United States but also made Chiang Kai Shek group have a more pessimistic assessment of the effect of its military intervention in Chinese Mainland politics.

From September 6 to 13, 1963, Jiang Jingguo visited Washington. On September 9, he met with Klein, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Taipei station. Jiang Jingguo conveyed an important message to Klein, that is, “President Jiang has authorized him to declare that Taiwan does not intend to launch a military attack in the next 18 months unless there is a rebellion in the mainland.” [46] on September 10, Jiang Jingguo and the president’s special assistant for national security affairs George? During the Bondi talks, he reiterated: “the Kuomintang government will recognize the leadership of the United States and promise not to take actions that will lead to the risk of war. The Kuomintang is willing to discuss ways and means to weaken the Chinese Communist regime and eventually overthrow the regime, and believes that the solution to this problem must be more political than military.” [47] in November, the KMT held the “Ninth National Congress”, revised its strategy, and determined the general plan of “the overall war of counter offensive and national restoration”, that is, regard the mainland as the main battlefield and the Taiwan Strait as the supporting battlefield, and expand the way of anti Communist struggle from the military aspect to all fields of politics, economy and culture. [48]

On September 4, 1964, McGeorge, special assistant to the president for national security affairs? Bondi wrote to Deputy Secretary of state Wright, “related to the report of the ‘blue lion’ [49] plan, I read with great interest that you further elaborated on the issue of recovering the mainland in your cable No. 138 to us. The shift in the focus of the plan of the Republic of China you found is natural, although we cannot fully respond to it.” [50] at the same time, the United States continued to compress Taiwan’s strategic space for possible “counterattack against the mainland”. On the same day (September 4), the U.S. State Department sent a letter to the U.S. Embassy in Taiwan on “the activities of the Republic of China in Thailand and Myanmar”, It is required to clearly inform the Taiwan authorities that “the Republic of China has other plans in Southeast Asia. When pursuing the goal of opposing the mainland, the Republic of China naturally tends to exceed the prudent limits we believe and is not so honest to us”; The United States “did assure the Burmese people that it opposed the recurrence of the problem of Chinese irregular forces”, and the United States “decided to do everything possible to ensure that the Republic of China did not take excessive and reckless actions”. [51]

On November 6, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of staff of the United States sent a letter to Secretary of defense McNamara on “the Republic of China’s plan to land on the mainland of China”, suggesting that “the United States should not fully participate in the bilateral study on the idea of the Republic of China landing on the mainland of China”, and “criticized the unilateral plan of the government of the Republic of China” through the “Blue Lion” Committee; “Any negotiation between the United States and Taiwan must not lead to the commitment of the United States to participate in the formulation of the plan and support the landing of the Republic of China on the mainland”. [52] on September 22, 1965, Chiang Ching Kuo submitted to McNamara a “plan for the Kuomintang to land on the mainland and seize the five provinces in the Southwest (code named ‘big torch 5’)”. On September 29, Chiang Kai Shek also submitted the same proposal to general Wheeler of the United States on December 29. On January 24th, 1966, Chiang Kai Shek received a negative reply from the US State Department and the US Department of defense. Jiang Jingguo’s response to this was “disappointment and anger”. [53] Secretary of state Rusk also clearly instructed the U.S. Embassy in Taipei: “under the current foreseeable situation, we cannot support the landing action of the government of the Republic of China on the mainland, and we cannot agree to any military action against the mainland.” [54]

In March, 1966, the United States clearly stipulated in the forthcoming “military assistance manual” for Taiwan: “the military assistance of the United States will not deliberately support the government of the Republic of China to counter attack the mainland.” [55]

In March, 1967, Chiang Kai Shek wanted to take advantage of the difficult situation of the United States in the Vietnam War to once again put forward to the United States that “now is the time for the Republic of China to attack and overthrow the Communist regime on the mainland”. The answer was still:

The line advocated by President Chiang Kai Shek to Ambassador Goldenberg conflicts with our policy on the Vietnam issue. This route will involve the Republic of China in danger and disaster, and will lead to a greater risk of war, with incalculable consequences for the people of Asia, the United States and the world. The US government and people will not agree to take such action, but will oppose it. [56]

Since then, Chiang Kai Shek’s counterattack on the mainland has been more than willing but insufficient, and is declining day by day. In a letter to assistant secretary of state Rostow on April 30, 1968, Jenkins at the National Security Council said that “Chiang Kai Shek has reassessed his position in history, and he may accept the fact that he cannot return to the mainland (although he cannot say so)”. [57]


Vi. 1962: basic summary of the game between China, the United States and the Soviet Union and its consequences

Now it seems that Mao Zedong was full of a high degree of dialectical and artistic vision in dealing with the contradictions of pressure. At that time, Chiang Kai Shek’s counterattack in the southeast was the main contradiction in form, but this main contradiction was long-term and strategic. Chiang Kai Shek’s counterattack on the mainland was limited and belonged to the residual nature of the civil war, and its contradiction belonged to the contradiction between the enemy and ourselves; From the southwest, Nehru’s encroachment on China is timeless, endless and invasive, but its contradiction belongs to the internal contradiction of the third world countries; Looking from the northwest, the mass flight incident made by the Soviet Union in Xinjiang, China is a social imperialism that creates unrest and puts pressure on China, including both ideological conflict and Soviet hegemony.

The common point of these three contradictions is to take advantage of China’s temporary difficulties to create domestic political turmoil and shake the regime of the Communist Party of China. Overall, the contradiction in the southeast is the main contradiction that cannot be reconciled, but it is only the main contradiction at the strategic level; Southwest China is the main contradiction that harms China most directly and needs to be stopped immediately, but it is only the main contradiction at the tactical level. In these two kinds of contradictions, the former is limited at the tactical level and infinite at the strategic level; The latter contradiction is limited at the strategic level, but infinite at the tactical level. For this reason, Mao Zedong adopted the method of combining virtual reality with reality, that is, fighting falsely in the southeast to create international momentum; While fighting in the southwest, it is reasonable and tolerant, and extremely prepared, waiting for the opportunity to attack later and easy to control the scale of the war: the premise of war is that there can be no intervention of major powers.

It happens that the Cuban missile crisis provides such an opportunity for China to solve the contradiction in Southwest China.

On October 20, 1962, the day the United States announced its blockade of Cuba, China announced the beginning of its counterattack against India. Its offensive was as fierce as a mountain and a sea. On November 20, Kennedy announced the final end of the blockade. On November 21, the Soviet Union also issued a mobilization order to “lift” the army. On the same day (November 21), the Chinese government announced a ceasefire across the China India border. Since then, the Chinese army has been as quiet as a virgin.

This movement and silence within one month ensured the finiteness of the war, the tactical nature of the counter attack, and finally the deterrence of various peripheral attempts against the Communist Party of China. The most important thing is that China opened and closed its warplanes in time, winning both war and peace; In international public opinion, he is both a winner and a messenger of peace.

Mao Zedong won the war all based on an objective estimate of the balance of power in the two directions of the southeast. In June and August 1962, when listening to reports from Yang Chengwu and Xu Shiyou that Chiang Kai Shek might have a military adventure in the southeast coast recently, he said on how many troops Chiang Kai Shek could invest in counterattacking the mainland: “the enemy can come up to 150000, no matter how many.” Mao Zedong was in favor of adopting the policy of coping with the invading enemy. “When necessary, the operational plan of the enemy’s attack can be announced.”. At the same time, Mao Zedong also said that the Xinhua News Agency newsletter, which exposed Chiang Kai Shek’s conspiracy to invade the southeast coast, still needs to see. It’s still time. [58] here, Mao Zedong’s maximum scale of invading Chiang Kai Shek in the southeast has made a limit estimate of “150000 at most”, although this is nothing great in Mao Zedong’s view. However, if we consider fighting in the southeast and southwest battlefields at the same time, this should also be avoided as far as possible.

For this reason, Mao Zedong chose the southwest in the southeast and southwest battlefields, and at the same time, he used the ingenious trick of retreating the enemy with Wen, which was used in the liberation war in October 1948, [59] psychologically weakened the attempt of the United States and Chiang Kai Shek to invade the southeast on a large scale. On June 24, the people’s Daily published the Xinhua News Agency Telegraph “the military and people of the country should be vigilant and prepare to smash the military adventures of Chiang Kai Shek’s gangs”, which was reviewed and finalized by Mao Zedong. On June 27, U.S. President Kennedy issued a statement on the situation in the Taiwan Strait, saying that he would not support Chiang Kai Shek’s attack on Chinese Mainland. Subsequently, Britain, France and the Soviet Union all exerted international pressure on Chiang Kai Shek’s counter offensive plan.

Mao Zedong’s strategy of “empty in the East and solid in the South” has achieved surprising results.

After confirming that there was no danger in the southeast, Mao Zedong began to make a serious layout in the southwest in July. At the end of a military high-level meeting in October 1962, Mao Zedong said:

When China and India go to war, it goes without saying that the United States and the Soviet Union, many countries that do not know the truth will also side with them, and Chiang Kai Shek may also want to do something. We are a little isolated, I think, not afraid. As long as the front line is well fought, we will be in an active position. I’m still saying that it’s better to die standing than kneeling. It’s not so easy to want us to die. If we don’t fight this war, it will be over. If we fight it, it will be majestic. We must maintain peace for at least 30 years. [60]

As a result, Mao Zedong made a false move in the southeast, mobilized the overall situation, isolated the United States in international public opinion, and surprised the “sword” in the southwest. He quickly opened and closed, taking into account the limited nature of contradictions between the third world countries, and deterred various attempts by the United States and the Soviet Union to interfere in China’s affairs at the most difficult time in China. After careful study, compared with sending troops to North Korea in the early 1950s, Mao Zedong’s action against India in the southwest was merciful, which was different from Zhugeliang’s “seven arrests of Meng Huo”. In 1950, Mao Zedong wanted to compete with the U.S. imperialism in the northeast to play the minimum strategic position of new China, while in 1962, Mao Zedong wanted long-term stability and peace in the southwest.

With regard to the Sino Indian War in 1962, American scholar Fei Zhengqing commented with appreciation in the Cambridge History of the people’s Republic of China Edited by him:

Judging from the characteristics of the battle, China’s losses are undoubtedly much smaller. Many Indian troops fell under the sudden attack, and the rest fled. Politically, Beijing gave New Delhi the last humiliation, not only returning all the northeast border special zone free of charge, but also returning all prisoners of war and trucks, artillery and ammunition with a detailed list. Last but not least, in the dark contrast with Khrushchev’s handling of the Cuban issue, Mao was neither “adventurism” nor “capitulationism”. His unique approach to ending the war ruled out the possibility of “imperialism” or “revisionism” taking any action for Nehru, while at the same time preserving the strategic Aksai Chin plateau, from which the Xinjiang Tibet highway passes. [61]

On the other hand, Khrushchev looked like “he wanted to learn from Kunpeng without wings” [62], but he wanted to “work with magnets” in Cuba without a “diamond”, acting as a hero. As a result, the Soviet Union was completely in disgrace after it emerged in the political game of world powers at the end of 1962. During the same period, international politics became a diplomatic burden and national humiliation in the hands of hatch, while art and philosophy were played out in the hands of Mao Zedong. On February 22nd, 1972, during his visit to China, US President Nixon said that Mao and Zhou were “people with philosophical minds” and “they are people who see far away”. [63] Napoleon III seems to be a living treasure in the political history of great powers. Kissinger once compared Napoleon III with Bismarck:

The sad thing about Napoleon III is that his eyes are high and his hands are low; Bismarck’s regret is that his ability is beyond the socially acceptable level. Napoleon III left France with strategic immobility; Bismarck left Germany an unparalleled feat. [64]

Marx also made a similar comparison between the two Napoleon emperors in French history:

The old Napoleon was used to occupying the capital of the modern world, while the little Napoleon was satisfied with the big stage scene, dispersing his troops to some unimportant countries and cramming his elite troops into so many dead ends. [65]

Although it is not exact, we will also be inspired to observe the Soviet Union’s diplomacy and China’s diplomacy in 1962 and their consequences from this perspective. Kissinger said, “the final result of Khrushchev’s failure in Berlin and Cuba is that the Soviet Union will no longer directly challenge the United States.”. [66] more importantly, the Soviet Union’s diplomacy in 1962 also lost the trust of socialist countries, and Khrushchev also lost domestic political support, leading to his resignation in 1964.

From the perspective of China, if excluding the “several flies hitting the wall and buzzing” of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries [67], Mao Zedong once “wielded his sword” in the southwest, which not only pushed back the United States and Chiang Kai Shek in the southeast, but also achieved the strategic goal of “maintaining peace for at least 30 years” in the southwest.

In 1962, especially after the success of China’s nuclear test in 1964, there was only the sound of war but no war in Southwest China. In the southeast, the United States and Chiang Kai Shek only invaded the “thief’s heart” but not the “thief’s courage”. The United States suppressed Chiang Kai Shek’s “counter offensive” plan in Taiwan more severely. In June, 1963, Chiang Kai Shek sent six more groups of armed men to land and were completely wiped out; In May and August 1965, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party fought two naval battles. Apart from shouting, Chiang Kai Shek did not take any major military action.

Selected from section 4 of Chapter 3 of China’s national security strategy in a global perspective (Shandong people’s publishing house, 2008 Edition), a new book by Zhang wenmu.

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