Putin’s fans fiercely criticize the Russian army’s strategy! Is the Russian army transferred or defeated in northern Ukraine?

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Author: north wind source: north wind snow forest (ID: beifengxuelin)

In the past week, the Russian Ukrainian battlefield, which has been quiet for a long time, experienced the biggest sudden change in the situation in several months.

The Ukrainian army organized a counterattack in the northern Kharkov region and recaptured more than 1000 square meters of territory from the Russian army in a week.

The important military towns of barakliya, ikum, kupyansk and bonus man, which the Russian army has occupied for more than half a year, were “recovered” by the Ukrainian army in a few days.

The Ukrainian military and Western media are constantly exaggerating the “counter offensive results” of this week around the world, as if this is the “reversal moment” of the Russian Ukrainian war.

The strategic Department of the Russian army responded that the Russian army “completed its strategic contraction so that after the army rested, it could better invest in new battles.”

Chechen leader Kadyrov, who has devoted a lot of troops to Ukraine’s back, obviously does not accept the explanation of the Russian military. He posted a 12 minute video on the social platform to scold the strategic experts of the Russian Defense Ministry.

Kadyrov is known as Putin’s fan brother because of his “adoring respect” for Putin. But this time Kadyrov was obviously angry.

He directly said: “if the Russian army does not adjust its strategy in the next day or two, he will personally talk to Putin!”

What makes Putin’s fans so angry is that the Russian army is shrinking and transferring in the Kharkov region? Or is it a rout?

Will Ukraine’s “September return attack” become a “watershed” in the Russian Ukrainian war?

First, the Russian army should face up to “tactical failure”!

In the past week, the news about the Russian Ukrainian war in the international public opinion is still very complicated, filled with many “opposing views, it is difficult to tell the true from the false”.

Western media with a pro Ukrainian stance reported that the Ukrainian army was advancing extremely rapidly in the Kharkov region and occupied many important “military towns” in the Russian Ukrainian war in a week.

Pro Russian media focused on the effective counterattack of the Russian army during its strategic retreat. The Russian army unexpectedly found that it was more efficient to fight the “counter offensive” Ukrainian army during its retreat than the previous onslaught.

According to the ancient Chinese art of war, strategic retreat has become “luring the enemy in depth”.

The Ukrainian army also did not deny that it almost paid a “five for one” war loss ratio with Russian soldiers in the “counter offensive”.

How can we judge the real war situation in the Kharkov region when there is so much information about the “psychological warfare” between Russia and Ukraine?

First of all, judging from the reality of the battlefield, both sides can not “refute” this, that is, the Ukrainian army has added a number of important military towns and recovered more than 2000 square kilometers of “lost land” in a week.

At the same time, the “counter offensive” organized by the Ukrainian army is a “plain offensive” with inferior weapons and firepower. Therefore, the casualties paid are indeed huge.

The reality of the battlefield is consistent in the reports of both sides. The difference is that “the reason for this battlefield fact” is that the Ukrainian army counterattacks “with too high morale”? Or is it a deliberate strategic shift by the Russian army?

My view is that the information warfare and public opinion warfare departments of the Russian army need to strengthen their capabilities.

The Russian army’s rout in Kharkov can fully stand up and accept a tactical failure against the background of tight manpower and intelligence.

However, the Russian army, which “can only win but can not lose”, insisted on using the excuse of “active strategic transfer”.

The Russian army has not used this move of active strategic transfer. The key is that this “initiative” must be announced in advance.

For example, in March and April, the Russian army changed its “strategy and tactics” and withdrew its troops from the Kiev area.

Both of them released the information of strategic transfer in advance, so although the Ukrainian army bragged about “how much land has been recovered”, the whole world laughed it off.

The same is true in the Kharkov region this time. Now the Russian army has only over 100000 combat troops in Ukraine, and there is great defensive pressure on the eastern and southern lines. So the strategy of “shrinking and shifting” in the northern Kharkov region conforms to the phased strategy of the Russian army.

However, if the Russian army “announced its contraction first”, then Ukraine’s subsequent counterattack against occupation will not improve its “morale” and “international influence”.

Now it is a fierce battle between Russia and Ukraine, and the “active strategic contraction” view released by the Russian army after its withdrawal is certainly a laughing matter.

Some friends think that on the battlefield, it should be “virtual but real”. Of course, the withdrawal strategy of the Russian army should not be announced to the enemy first.

However, this military action is obviously different, because the Russian army’s propaganda is “luring the enemy in depth during withdrawal and causing great damage to the Ukrainian army”.

Since there is a “strategy of luring the enemy in retreat”, shouldn’t we “announce the strategic contraction” in advance, and then lead the Ukrainian army to “seize lost land”, so as to expand the results of luring the enemy in depth?

Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the Russian army encountered “tactical failure” in the Kharkov region in the past week.

The “strategic contraction” announced afterwards is just an excuse to make up for it, which is why Putin’s fan brother Kadyrov is so angry!

Second, Russia needs stronger “war momentum”!

After understanding Russia’s “tactical failure” in the Kharkov region, we can’t help asking why Ukraine, which has been under pressure for more than half a year, suddenly has such a strong fighting capacity?

In the first half of the year, it was very difficult for Russia to capture Kharkov and break through the backup line between Russia and Southeast Ukraine. Why was it so easy to lose the strategic town that it had acquired so hard?

I think the main reason is that at least at present, in this September, Ukraine’s desire to “fight a big war and win a war” is far stronger than Russia’s.

As I mentioned in my previous articles on analyzing the situation in the EU, there is no change in politicians’ high-profile support for Ukraine within the EU countries.

However, the EU’s actual assistance to Ukraine, especially the promised advanced military assistance, has been suspended for several months.

Recently, Ukraine received the largest military assistance, which was $7 billion from US President Biden. However, Zelensky also saw that Mr. Biden was in jeopardy in the next November’s midterm elections.

Once the democratic party loses control of Congress in the midterm elections, the Biden administration will not be able to smoothly carry out the follow-up military assistance to Ukraine.

Therefore, before the US midterm elections, the Ukrainian authorities must use battlefield victory and vigorous fighting spirit to let the United States see that “continued assistance will consume the value of Russia”.

Similarly, Ukraine must also show its fighting power to Europe, which has “stopped providing assistance”, prove that it has a chance to win, and let European financiers “make money quickly” and fight in the counterattack war.

Compared with the atmosphere of “life and death war” in Ukraine, Russia obviously lacks respect for Ukraine’s counter offensive.

In the past few months, especially after Russia defeated Mariupol and exterminated the Azov battalion, the next wars were saw saw wars and attrition wars.

In the past few months, we have found that Russia’s most brilliant battlefield is not in Ukraine, but in the energy market and the currency market.

Obviously, in the past few months, Russia has strengthened its economic autonomy and energy harvesting ability to Europe by means of ruble settlement order, power cut-off of Beixi No. 1, settlement of energy exports with China, India and other countries in local currency.

What Putin and the Russian government are thinking about is how to deal with Europe’s “compromise” and exchange of interests after winter.

It is because both the government and the military in Russia regard winter as the “moment to decide the victory or defeat”, so they all have the mentality of “maintaining the status quo in September and October” and working hard after winter in November.

It is particularly appropriate to use the term “sailing against the current, not advancing or falling behind” in the Russian Ukrainian battlefield, which we often use in our study.

In the past two months, the Russian army only wants to “stabilize” its hand. The Ukrainian army really wants to launch a necessary “war of survival” to prove its existence.

In such a collision of two forces, one achieved actual results regardless of sacrifice, and the other “retreated”. It is only natural that the tactical failure of belittling the enemy.

Third, this winter is the moment to decide Ukraine’s fate

Originally, on the Russian Ukrainian battlefield in the past week, the Russian army released a phrase of “active withdrawal”, and there would be disputes over the results of the war in the international community.

However, Putin’s fan brother Kadyrov’s 12 minute video made public around the world has obviously uncovered the false mask.

Kadyrov’s original words are: “let Putin know the truth of the battlefront!”.

It is obvious that this is an “open conflict” between the military strategies of the Chechen army generals at the front and the strategic personnel of the Ministry of national defense at the rear.

This phenomenon of “displeasure between generals” should not occur on the absolutely dominant side in a war.

Yes, at least so far, there has been no change in the strength comparison between the two sides directly participating in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The small victory of the Ukrainian army in the Kharkov region, which is close to the Russian border, can be quickly recaptured as long as the Russian army finishes trimming and re enters the battlefield.

The biggest impact of this “tactical failure” was that Chechen warlords like Kadyrov showed great distrust of the central army.

In this kind of coalition war, the distrust between local warlords and the central army eventually led to the final defeat of the attackers of the “powerful coalition force” in the war of “great disparity between strength and weakness”. It is not uncommon at all times and in all countries.

In the past six months, although Ukraine has blown western support to the skies and its own will to resist, the Russian Ukrainian war has never shown the characteristics or elements of those “weak wins strong” campaigns in ancient and modern history.

However, today, the Chechen armed forces show great distrust of the Russian Ministry of defense and their tough attitude of demanding a change of strategy within a limited time, exposing the contradiction between “local forces and central forces”.

Of course, Kadyrov’s prestige today is largely due to the bonus of his status as Putin’s fan brother. His loyalty to Putin is still there, so Putin’s ability to coordinate conflicts between the Chechen armed forces and the central army is there.

The Kharkov counterattack war boasted by the West in the recent week can only be regarded as a tactical victory of the Ukrainian army “between life and death”.

The most crucial thing for the direction of the Russian Ukrainian war is the next winter. Putin’s silence on the battlefield in the past few months is to lay out the card of European winter energy crisis.

If this winter, using the European energy crisis, Putin can obtain the “turn” or “some tacit approval” of the EU in the Ukraine war, that is the key to determining the success or failure of the war.

Of course, if Europe plays the card of winter energy crisis, Europe will eventually choose “freezing to death is small, and dishonour is big”! Well, Putin’s punch, which he had prepared for half a year, seemed to blow on cotton.

At that time, Russia will only have the way to fight a big war by “indiscriminate bombing at no cost”!

The war between Russia and Ukraine, whether to fight a political account or a big war next, depends on who can endure better this winter!

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