Author: Dragon tooth source: a mountain of dragon tooth (id:longyadeyizuoshan)
On the evening of June 19, 2022, China conducted a land-based midcourse antimissile interception technology test in China, and the test achieved the expected purpose. The experiment is defensive and not aimed at any country.
We have already talked about the technical issues, and those who are smart have also shaken. The response caused by this news is far less than that of the 003 aircraft carrier, but it is also of great significance. I will mainly talk about the nuclear strategy game.
The mid course anti missile interception can also be called “cruise phase interception”, which is the interception carried out after the rocket engine of the ballistic missile is shut down and before re-entry into the atmosphere.
This is the trajectory of a traditional ballistic missile. On the whole, it is an approximate parabola. It has mobility before the shutdown point and after re-entry, and can change the trajectory to avoid interception within a certain range; The middle section (cruise section) between the shutdown point and the re-entry point has no maneuverability, which is a parabola.
It is generally believed that the so-called “help”
The “push phase interception” can only pose a threat to the ballistic missiles of small and weak countries. For example, the famous “THAAD” system has a certain possibility against North Korea. Against China, it mainly plays the role of reconnaissance and surveillance. It is a dream to intercept. This interception method must be pushed forward to reach the enemy’s launch position, or simply deployed to the orbit, or when your interceptor missiles fly to the target area, they will fly away.
Reentry interception is also called “terminal interception”. One is high risk and the other is poor effect. However, the technology is relatively simple and the warning time is longer. More interceptors can be used to try their luck. If the interception fails, there will be no second chance. Even if the interception succeeds, there is a great possibility that the nuclear bomb will become a dirty bomb. However, the whole flight segment has a warning time of 10 to dozens of minutes, which is much “friendly” to ballistic detection. It is also the deployment of interceptors in its own territory, and more interceptors can be launched at the same time to improve the hit probability.
The earliest so-called “anti missile” system of mankind is terminal interception, such as the “rubber overshoes” anti missile system of the former Soviet Union, which was developed in the 1960s:
The active terminal anti missile system is relatively reliable, but the penetration capability of ballistic missiles has also been enhanced. In short, it is a “spear and shield” problem.
For the “spear”, that is, the ballistic missile, you are embarrassed to say hello if you do not have the terminal orbit change capability. As early as the Shenzhou 5 mission, the news mentioned a sentence: “Shenzhou 5 has lift control capability”. I realized that China has already mastered the terminal orbit change capability of ballistic missiles. You should know that the landing accuracy and orbit change accuracy of a spaceship equipped with a big living person are very high. If you dare to control the so-called “lift”, you must have done countless experiments and mastered the ability to accurately control the landing point in the re-entry atmosphere. The warhead of the ballistic missile is numerous times stronger than that of a big living person, and can withstand much greater overload. If you dare to use this technology on a big living person, you will be proficient in the ballistic missile.
Later, Dongfeng 21 and Dongfeng 26 “both nuclear and conventional” ballistic missiles were exposed.
It shows that China has a warhead with terminal glide and orbit change, which sharply increases the difficulty of terminal interception.
Finally, there is the so-called “in atmosphere gliding”, that is, without the parabolic trajectory outside the atmosphere, we simply start hypersonic gliding directly inside the atmosphere.
It became very clear that the balance of ballistic missile game advantage began to tilt.
Today’s exposure of China’s mid course anti missile interception technology experiment is of great significance, which shows that the current mid course ballistic missile game has presented a “one-sided” situation: I can hit you, but you can’t hit me.
The vast majority of people did not think of this point, that is, for the main hypothetical opponent, his missile trajectory is old, with an extraatmospheric parabolic trajectory and a “mid course”, but his own mid course interception experiment has a low success rate; However, the trajectory of our missiles is new. The parabolic trajectory outside the atmosphere is short or not at all. The “middle section” is short or there is no “middle section” at all.
This is not one-sided what is this?
If you have any questions about this, this photo a while ago is very illustrative:
In the eagle strike 21 shipborne anti-ship ballistic missile experiment, the buff is becoming more and more awkward and longer. There is no way. The operational environment of Eagle strike 21 is to deeply grasp this one-sided approach, and does not give you reliable interception opportunities at all. There are many obstacles in takeoff boost and terminal interception, and there is simply no so-called “middle section”, and the penetration capability is directly full and in place. Eagle strike 21 is not exactly a “ballistic missile”. It has no traditional so-called “ballistic missile”. The whole flight track is haunted and is a typical example of hitting hard at the pain point.
As for the interception capability, although we still do not have an absolute advantage, we can at least achieve parity. I have what you have, and I do not have what you do not have. Everyone is half the weight. With the mid course anti missile interception test, it shows that everyone is at least on a technical level.
The game between spear and shield is a long-term spiral struggle. The penetration ability and interception ability are contradictory to each other. The imbalance on one side is the overall disadvantage. This is the most significant significance of the land-based midcourse anti missile interception test. It shows that the tilt of the balance is becoming more and more serious. In terms of medium-range ballistic missiles, the main assumption is that the enemy country is beginning to struggle and has to make considerable efforts to catch up.
At present, the game is mainly focused on medium range ballistic missiles, that is, local war – tactical nuclear weapons – the Western Pacific region. The next scale is all-round war, strategic nuclear weapons and all-round nuclear war. It is a well thought out decision to gain overall advantage at this level. This level is very subtle. The formation of absolute advantage has realized the perfect combination of “freedom” and “controllability” of the war scale, which can not only have enough space to play, but also not get out of control.
The “major enemy countries” will not go crazy and burn jade and stone in a full-scale nuclear war, but will also give us enough room to give full play to our industrial production strength, and will not be defeated in the first wave by the major enemy countries and their allies’ advantages in conventional weapons technology.
Recognizing this level, we almost understand the meaning.