Source: wechat id:dashuzhenzhang, governor of Dashu town
With the stalemate of the Russian Ukrainian front and the intensification of inflation, the United States, which is approaching the mid-term elections, urgently needs to find a new hot spot to replace the disappointments and losses caused by a series of setbacks.
On June 24, a U.S. p-8a anti submarine patrol aircraft openly intruded into the Taiwan Strait. Militarily, it is tantamount to a public challenge that “I have the right to pass here and conduct reconnaissance”.
As soon as the US patrol aircraft left, a drone from Taiwan also broke through the Strait and took advantage of the situation to challenge.
At the same time, the Taiwan military restarted the sealing up of the US military base stationed in Taiwan for many years. For the first time, “Tiangong III” missiles were deployed around “Greater Taipei”.
In addition, just a week ago, the Taiwan region had just launched a missile test. You Xikun, the Legislative Yuan president, publicly declared that “Taiwan’s Yunfeng missile has been mass produced and can reach Beijing”. Even the media on the island were in an uproar.
There is no doubt that this is the stimulation of internal response and external cooperation, which will stimulate us to use force with enthusiasm.
In fact, not only does the United States hope for a war in the Taiwan Strait, but there are also many voices within us who hope for a war.
At present, the broad masses have a lot of anxiety about the Taiwan issue, and to a large extent, this emotion stems from the lack of understanding of the Republic’s foreign game tradition, especially the working tradition of the Taiwan issue.
Therefore, it is necessary to briefly sort out the different stages of handling the Taiwan issue in the history of the Republic. After reading it, you must have a more intuitive and realistic understanding of “when to close Taiwan” and “whether to close Taiwan by force”.
01
Next, the work on Taiwan since 1949 is divided into ten stages. The main criterion for the stages is the change of the primary objective of the work on Taiwan.
What are the goals of Taiwan work? It is not difficult to think of just these:
1. Realize the reunification of the motherland;
2. Oppose Taiwan’s secession;
3. Maintaining national security;
4. Playing games with external powers (not with unification or independence as the main goal);
5. Obtain economic and technological resources from Taiwan.
At each stage, there is a question of who is the primary goal.
The Central Committee has always paid great attention to grasping and analyzing the main contradictions. Therefore, from the transformation of the primary goal to carry out the segmentation of counter work.
The first stage, 1949-1950.
The primary goal during this period was to complete the reunification of the motherland and eliminate the Chiang regime. Although there was such a failure in the Golden Gate campaign at the beginning, it should have been actively preparing to cross the sea at that time.
The liberation of Hainan has also boosted our confidence. Even if it is not to be completed immediately, it is to be won with one strike after planning military preparation.
Oil paintings of liberated Hainan Island
On the other hand, Taiwan’s infiltration work also has a considerable foundation (of course, it was unfortunately eliminated by the Chiang regime later).
However, this stage came to an end when the Korean War broke out in 1950 and the US Navy and air force began to defend Taiwan.
The second stage was from 1950 to the end of the Korean War.
At this stage, Chinese Mainland understands that it will no longer be possible to take the reunification of the motherland as the primary goal of its work on Taiwan in the foreseeable future, because the gap between us and the US Navy and air force is too great.
What is the primary goal of Taiwan work at this time? To maintain the security of the mainland, including but not limited to:
To prevent Chiang Kai Shek’s counterattack against the mainland, to mitigate the damage caused by the sea and air forces on the other side to our coastal areas, and to prevent Taiwan from sending forces to the Korean Peninsula to fight against us.
Of course, in the field of national security, due to the ongoing Korean War, the pressure on Taiwan can only be regarded as the second most important direction of national security.
The third stage was from the end of the Korean War to the late 1950s.
At this stage, the primary goal of Taiwan work is not clear, but on the whole, it is still inclined to the stage of maintaining national security.
Taiwan’s security threat to the mainland still exists, but the degree has declined. In particular, the achievements of the Korean War have greatly improved China’s national defense security confidence.
Among all the geographical directions, it may be said that the Taiwan Strait direction was the direction with the greatest security pressure at that time, but on the whole, it was the time when the security pressure was the lowest in the 30 years since the founding of the party.
On the other hand, the objective conditions of the large gap between the Chinese Mainland and the US Navy and air force have not changed. It is indeed unrealistic to take the reunification of the motherland as the primary goal. The country’s main task has also shifted to economic and social development.
At the same time, the Chiang regime objectively gained the time to consolidate its rule and stabilize its footing in Taiwan.
At this stage, the mainland has also done a good job in consolidating the foundation, such as the completion of the strategic yingsha Xiamen railway and the first joint sea, land and air operations to win a Jiangshan island.
According to the game thinking of normal people, at that time, the mainland and Taiwan can almost cease to exist. At most, there may be some friction around the competition for coastal routes and air routes, or some small battles around some islands.
These actions are also true, but the mainland leaders creatively came up with a new option to bring Taiwan work to the next stage.
02
The fourth stage began in 1958.
With the shelling of Kinmen as the main landmark event, a new and clear primary goal for Taiwan work has been formed: to make use of the Taiwan issue to play a low-intensity game with the United States and the Soviet Union.
Many people are quite clear about the analysis. Although the United States is strong and weak militarily in the Taiwan Strait region, from the perspective of the global strategy of the United States, Taiwan is a prominent part of the secondary direction.
Therefore, on the one hand, Taiwan can take the initiative to create military pressure to contain the United States (for example, this means to support the Middle East politically). On the other hand, the United States can use the extremely difficult characteristics of its intelligence work with China to create suspicion between the United States and the Soviet Union by shelling Kinmen (for example, the United States often suspects that the shelling of Kinmen was instigated or at least acquiesced by the Soviet Union).
Shelling Kinmen Island
Note: the main goal of the game is not to deal with the issue of reunification or independence, but to ensure that China retains its political position as an important player in international affairs without such a military arena as the Korean War and its economic share is too low, and to try to prevent the Soviet Union and the United States from easing at the expense of China.
Of course, the realization of this goal does not only depend on the Taiwan work, but also serves as a part of this big goal.
The fifth stage will begin in the mid-1960s at the latest.
At this stage, the Taiwan issue has changed again. Generally speaking, Taiwan’s importance has declined significantly.
Originally, judging from the situation at the end of the 1950s, the Taiwan issue could become the number one chess piece for China and the United States to play a big game. However, in the early 1950s, as the United States replaced France to enter Vietnam and the degree of involvement was greatly deepened, Vietnam squeezed out Taiwan and became the number one pawn in the game between China and the United States.
On the other hand, the United States has gradually adapted to the rhythm of the game of shelling Kinmen, and the importance of Taiwan’s game has decreased significantly.
At the same time, with the growth of the mainland’s military strength, especially its air defense capability, Taiwan’s threat to the mainland’s coastal areas and airspace has also decreased. With nuclear weapons, the risk of Taiwan’s counter offensive is basically gone.
But unification is still far away.
In short, Taiwan has become less important at this stage, and it is not clear whether there is an absolute core primary goal. In addition, the internal chaos at that time is a drag on the energy of the decision-making level, and the work on Taiwan is actually maintaining the status quo.
Here, let’s talk about the choice of chess pieces. There are three chess pieces in the geopolitical game between China and the United States: North Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.
North Korea was once the fiercest direction, but this direction has been dead since the armistice: no one has the will to start a war again. After all, the limit test before the armistice has measured the strength of the defensive fortifications and capabilities of both sides, and it is easy to become a meat grinder when the war starts again.
China does not like this kind of static strategic confrontation, which is what the United States and the Soviet Union are good at or adapt to. They have already done so in Europe anyway.
Static strategic confrontation for a long time is easy to solidify the existing order, which is not in line with China’s aspirations and the tradition that the central government should grasp the macro initiative in the struggle.
For a time, China basically withdrew from the Korean Peninsula chess game (marked by the withdrawal of all volunteer troops), and perhaps there were also considerations in this regard.
For at least a period of time after the Kinmen artillery battle, the United States and the Soviet Union were brought to the rhythm by China, which is in line with our party’s struggle philosophy of grasping the initiative. However, there is one drawback: the intensity is low.
China’s game in Taiwan can upset the United States, but it can’t bleed the United States. To bleed, we have to look at Vietnam.
Vietnam’s game in the direction of China’s consumption is not small, but at that time, it was the best choice for China to take into account the three elements of China’s national strength, China’s risk and the damage of the United States.
The US Army deeply involved in the Vietnam War
The situation in Vietnam should not be the result of setting up a bureau for the United States in the middle and early 1950s, but driven by political imagination in the process of advancing with the times.
Of course, the premise is that they have the awareness of burning cold stoves before. Think about some such cold stoves (such as Africa).
03
The sixth stage began in the early 1970s.
With the adjustment of the triangular relationship between China, the United States and the Soviet Union, especially the United States seeking to establish normal relations with China, the importance of Taiwan has risen sharply.
The number one pawn in the game between China and the United States was originally Vietnam, but at this stage, the United States has decided to try to exit Vietnam with dignity, and China also intends not to embarrass the United States here, so Taiwan’s ranking has come forward.
China, on the other hand, takes advantage of the fact that the United States is more anxious than China politically, and takes Taiwan as the most important link for the United States to make major political concessions to China in the process of China and the United States approaching.
I would like to remind you that the 1972 Shanghai Communique, as the basis of China US relations, is not an equal communique or an equal treaty from the perspective of naked observation of advance and retreat without moral cloaks——
The United States has made major substantive political concessions in Taiwan.
On february21,1972, then US President Nixon arrived in Beijing
The Shanghai Communique said that the US side stated that it recognizes that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait believe that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China”. The United States “raises no objection” to this position and confirms that it will eventually withdraw all its troops and military facilities from Taiwan.
At the same time, China has not made any reciprocal political concessions to the United States, because the statement on the Taiwan issue is the only dry goods in the Shanghai Communique (the other dry goods are the completely equal China and the United States, which recognize different systems but respect each other’s sovereignty and advocate a peaceful solution to the issue, thus strongly suggesting the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations).
This is that China has gained the upper hand in negotiations with the United States based on its power status. However, this strength is not mainly China’s hard power that is still far weaker than that of the United States, but China’s game strength.
As a long-term pawn of the mainland, Taiwan has finally reached the stage of contributing fruit.
It is worth noting that the long-term strategic determination and action of the mainland have made the United States finally give in, casting a huge shadow in the hearts of the “American allies” in East and Southeast Asia, and making China’s great authority in East and Southeast Asia.
At the same time, the Shanghai Communique is also a profound ideological work done by the United States to the “Republic of China” people in Taiwan, basically abolishing the spiritual will of the “Republic of China” people.
Shanghai Communique 25th anniversary stamps issued in 1997
It has been nearly eight years since Kissinger came to China to establish diplomatic relations between China and the United States. In fact, the primary goal of handling Taiwan Affairs in these eight years was to use Taiwan as a pawn in negotiations with the United States.
This chess piece is not used to solve the issue of reunification or independence (the chairman himself said that the issue of reunification can wait for a long time) but to gain the highest possible political status in the adjustment of major country relations.
This round of game was completed in stages in the 1979 communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. Finally, the United States recognized one China and Taiwan as a part of China.
04
The seventh stage began in 1979.
At the beginning of 1979, several major events took place: the official proposal of the policy of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems” against Taiwan (a letter to Taiwan compatriots), the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the visit of leaders to the United States, and China’s War against Vietnam. And the recent announcement of reform and opening up.
From this time node, the primary goal of Taiwan work will no longer be national security or playing games with the United States, but to obtain Taiwan’s extremely valuable economic, technological, management experience and investment.
In order to open up to the outside world, China not only needs to change its own system, but also needs to learn foreign ways of playing and connect with foreign countries. In this process, there is an urgent need for experienced people to take the lead.
People from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, play the most prominent role in the process of bringing the belt and the mainland.
In addition, at that time, Taiwan began to get rich gradually, and the mainland expected that it would also have considerable help in importing capital.
So during this period, although peaceful reunification has been mentioned in the slogan, the realization of reunification is not the primary goal (the leaders are not naive enough to think that political reunification can be achieved in the short term), and the economy is the primary goal.
Xianshi department store opened by Taiwanese businessmen in Fujian in the late 1980s
“Peaceful reunification, one country, two systems” is a long-term strategy to occupy the name of the great cause, but in the short term, it is a delaying measure to match this primary goal. In fact, the issue of reunification is left to future generations.
The online rumors that “anything can be discussed as long as one China is recognized” and even “changing the country’s name and not stationing troops” have not been officially verified. But even if it is true, it is essentially a delaying tactic.
If Taiwan talks, it is likely that the mainland will drag it into a marathon negotiation (probably no less than a generation) to avoid excessive political concessions, and then continue to engage in economic integration in the process.
Given the unfavorable balance of power and great political differences, the mainland is very determined to engage in such marathon negotiations. We might as well think about the Sino US contacts in Geneva in the 1950s (through the most intense struggle stage in the Korean War Era) to the establishment of political diplomatic relations in 1979; Let’s think about China and the Soviet Union from the end of the 1960s, when Zhou Enlai and kosikin met, to the end of 1989, when Gorbachev visited China——
The powerful United States and the Soviet Union finally gave in to a much weaker China. How can Taiwan, a small island, sustain this marathon?
However, if Taiwan does not come to the talks, the political pressure will be mainly on the Taiwan side. Therefore, the political myth of “the Republic of China as China’s orthodoxy” has been fundamentally hit at this stage.
In the long run, as long as the cross-strait military pressure continues to ease and the Sino US political relations in the 1980s are maintained for a long time, coupled with the background that local factions will rise, the KMT will easily fall into a political situation of internal and external difficulties after the collapse of ideological narration.
On the other hand, due to its control over the channel of economic integration and the experience of KMT communist cooperation in history, it is difficult to imagine that the KMT can insist on not easing up on the mainland and gaining political power from the mainland for a long time.
That is to say, in the grand chess game, the Chinese Communist Party does not need to seek the political support of the Kuomintang to stabilize its governance in the mainland, but the Kuomintang must have a great demand for political support from the mainland. This can not be changed by Jiang Jingguo himself.
Inspecting Jiang Jingguo in his later years in agricultural work
Although the drastic changes in the international situation broke our various plans in the 1980s, the judgment on the needs of political forces on both sides of the Taiwan Straits was still right. Later (in the first decade of the 21st century), the Kuomintang did come to this road.
In addition, the easing of tensions with Taiwan is also of very positive significance to the development of diplomacy with the United States, the consolidation of the encirclement of the Soviet Union and the political settlement of the Hong Kong issue.
05
The eighth stage began in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Taiwan affairs work has entered the next stage, in which the primary objective is not clear. This stage ended in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996.
During this period, on the one hand, economic integration is still taking place, but on the other hand, great changes have taken place in the international climate and the microclimate on the island, which makes China’s foreign work (not limited to work on Taiwan) difficult in a short time.
With regard to the Taiwan issue, I am afraid that Lee Teng Hui’s strong rise and great changes in public opinion, as well as his efforts to manipulate US forces to provoke trouble in the Taiwan Strait, have exceeded Beijing’s expectations.
In addition, Beijing has too many major adjustment tasks with priorities far higher than those of cross-strait relations in other external directions. Therefore, during this period, it has indeed fallen into a passive position in its work on Taiwan, and even the most stable work on Hong Kong has been disadvantageous.
It is likely that the United States will also find it difficult to grasp the rapid changes in the situation on Taiwan Island, and like China, the United States has too many other directions with much higher priorities.
Taken together, both China and the United States have a strong willingness to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. However, Lee Teng Hui has other ideas.
Jiang Jingguo and Li Denghui
Historically, during the period of great adjustment between the two great powers, the small regime on the edge of the confrontation that is not focused by the great powers for the time being will have the opportunity to release the game energy that exceeds its own hard power.
This is the period when Taiwan has the highest strategic initiative. Lee Teng Hui has basically become a chess player.
The unexpected rise of the island’s independent forces and the provocation of China US confrontation from 1995 to 1996 are all powerful manifestations of Lee Teng Hui’s initiative to mobilize populist and major country political forces.
In the end, Lee Teng Hui succeeded in forcing both China and the United States to turn their political focus back to Taiwan.
In the ninth stage, from the beginning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, the primary objective of the work on Taiwan was clear: to prevent the Taiwan independence forces from splitting up.
Note that this is the first time that anti secession has become the primary goal of Taiwan work.
It should also be noted that anti secession and promoting reunification are two very different goals, and their work ideas are very different. At that time, China could only care about anti secession, and anti secession was linked to national security to a certain extent, because there was a risk of US military intervention.
From 1995 to 1996, China’s way of handling the Taiwan Strait crisis was to show strength and weakness. That is to say, from the most macroscopic scale, this is a kind of weakness: weakness towards the United States.
The message conveyed in the show of weakness is: I know that you are stronger than me in the United States, and I recognize that your security dominance in East Asia is higher than mine.
However, the way of showing weakness is to show strength, which is partly to Taiwan and partly to the United States.
The brief message is: Although I admit the strength of the United States, it’s hard to say what I will do to lose two or three.
On the whole, this strong and weak indication has achieved the goal, that is, the security situation in Taiwan has not further deteriorated during the Clinton term, and at the same time, the United States has not greatly strengthened its preparedness against China, but has become more and more relaxed towards China in the field of economic opening.
The operating space here is extremely small and difficult, but the Chinese leaders did it.
A sign of the success of the mainland game after 1996 is the relative ease of the Taiwan Strait situation in 1999.
In 1999, Lee Teng Hui first put forward the two-state theory, which was much worse politically than Lee Teng Hui’s behavior in 1995-1996 (in contrast, the fuse of the latter was his visit to the United States), but it was far less stressful than in 1996.
The United States basically did not accept the move. Instead, it made a key breakthrough in the negotiations on China’s accession to the WTO in the same year (it is impossible for the United States not to release politically).
In july1999, the occasion when Lee Teng Hui dished out the two-state theory was probably related to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy by the United States in May. He may feel that he has smelled the opportunity again.
However, as mentioned above, this time no major event was stirred up. In addition, he was about to step down, and Taiwan’s strategic initiative began to be taken back by the big powers.
Since then, Lee Teng Hui’s dream of becoming a politically independent chess player on the edge of the confrontation between major powers is about to be dashed (the formal and complete dashes will await Chen Shuibian’s failure).
After that, the situation deteriorated again with Chen Shuibian coming to power and the United States’ military myth in the early days of Iraq——
This is the key behind the famous issues of the Chen Shuibian era, such as the constitution rectification, the referendum on joining the United Nations, the two bullets, the betrayal of the “four no’s and one no’s” commitment, and the termination of the national unification program.
Any one of them is far more provocative than Tsai ing Wen’s so-called “provocation” in recent years (compared with Tsai ing Wen, she can be said to be a super obedient girl).
This time, China adopted the classic weak deterrence strategy.
To put it simply, it is to impose an unexpected threat on the powerful United States when it is in a state of lack of skills, so as to force the United States to turn its head against its younger brother.
China’s landmark measures are the “east of Xi’an” speech by special people and the adoption of the anti secession law.
This weak deterrence has achieved great success.
This is marked by the outbreak of Chen Shuibian’s scandal during his term of office in 2006 and the brutal political liquidation after he stepped down in 2008. The United States can protect him, but it chose not to protect him in the end, which is very illustrative in itself.
The scandal broke out and Chen Shuibian was handcuffed
This time, China’s suppression of Taiwan independence is a combination of military and political suppression.
Not to mention the military aspect. The nuclear declaration east of Xi’an has come out. Politically, it means that political figures with Taiwan independence tendencies are shocked and cold hearted to the Americans.
They know that if they promote Taiwan independence to a certain extent, Chen Shuibian may end up waving to them. At the same time, the “great cause of Taiwan independence” may still be far away.
This interpretation of this matter is taboo in Taiwan’s open politics, but people with a clear eye should be able to see it.
Looking back many years later, we found that China’s historical task of anti secession has achieved a decisive victory, and then we can maintain this victory at a low cost.
06
The tenth stage, after 2008.
At this stage, the primary goal of China’s work on Taiwan has changed again: to play a big game with the United States.
Of course, the transition may not be achieved overnight. Many people’s ideas will not be achieved in one step when they switch from nervously opposing Taiwan independence for more than a decade to playing big chess with Taiwan. This is one of the reasons why people have a profound misunderstanding about the Taiwan issue.
However, some people still haven’t turned their thinking around, so they are really a little bit late.
In fact, the international climate and the microclimate on the island in 2008 have changed dramatically.
The great changes in the international climate are the loss of neoconservatism in the United States and the financial crisis in the United States. The dramatic change in the island’s microclimate is that Ma Ying Jeou came to power to implement the mitigation route.
For quite some time after 2008, the real threat of secession has been extremely low (Ma Ying Jeou does not follow the secession line anyway). Of course, when Tsai ing Wen came to power, she still needed to study and judge the situation, but at that time, China’s anti secession deterrence capacity was greatly improved compared with that eight years ago.
Facts have proved that even if Tsai ing Wen came to power, she could do nothing at all.
Therefore, from 2008 to now, no matter what the subjective executors think, the objective implementation effect is equivalent to taking Taiwan as a pawn to play the game against the United States as the primary goal.
Otherwise? What else can be the primary goal?
Anti secession hardly requires the mainland to do anything, as long as it does not change its political language and its strength continues to expand.
At this stage, we are not willing to take the initiative to use force for reunification. Under peaceful conditions, we are far from reaching the critical point for Taiwan’s public opinion to change from independence to reunification. Therefore, if the primary goal is to achieve reunification, there is a lack of work to do.
As for taking national security or obtaining economic benefits as the primary goal of work on Taiwan, it is also too high on Taiwan.
At this stage, the primacy of the goal of taking Taiwan as a pawn to play games with the United States does not need to be deliberately planned and promoted by the decision-makers. The historical process will naturally bring us to this step.
In fact, this is how the United States’ anxiety in the Taiwan Strait came about in the past two years.
Even if there is no such activity as mainland military aircraft circling Taiwan, can the great anxiety of the United States be eliminated?
In the same sentence, as long as there is no change in politics and the relative strength is still expanding when it approaches the United States, the mainland hardly needs to do anything to actually achieve the dilemma of using Taiwan to contain the United States and placing the United States in a strategic position.
What’s more, we can also increase the pressure on the United States by constantly strengthening our muscles and cooperating with the great breakthroughs in the South China Sea.
In recent years, the US Navy and air force have been desperately trying to maintain a sense of presence in the South China Sea of the Taiwan Strait, at a great cost. However, they can neither provoke the major events in the Taiwan strait that some domestic factions in the United States want to provoke, nor gain the chips that some people fantasize about in the negotiations with China, nor can they prevent the overall economic situation in East and Southeast Asia from continuing to move towards the mainland as the center.
This is called lying down to win. This is because those who are good at fighting have made no great achievements. This is the result of the combined effect of predecessors’ sizing up the situation and making a difference and strategic determination.
07
The current work on Taiwan has actually entered the realm of “waiting for the weather”.
In recent years, even political work in Taiwan has been simplified, and there is basically no need to engage in any major political united front work.
The KMT’s value of the United Front has fallen precipitously since the late Ma Ying Jeou period, but the time for the DPP to carry out a great united front has not yet come (until the DPP factional split that may occur in the post Tsai ing Wen era).
The practice of the Tsai ing Wen era also shows that even without a decent political united front, the task of anti secession can be easily accomplished.
While the importance of political united front work has been drastically reduced for the time being, economic work can be more open to business.
In recent years, Taiwan’s deficit with the mainland has been high. I suggest that we should also be optimistic from the perspective of business. We should neither be pessimistic about “benefiting” the mainland too much (we can’t figure it out. We can see the figure of the United States “benefiting” the mainland through the deficit), nor indulge in the political arrangement that is playing a big chess game against Taiwan (it is no longer necessary to give up profits for the sake of the United Front, although we do not rule out the local policy inertia).
At present, we are still at this stage, and most of us will still be at this stage in the short term until the international climate changes again. This is the “time of day” mentioned above.
Finally, in the light of historical review, I would like to reiterate my views on achieving the goal of reunification.
Achieving reunification and opposing secession are two very different goals, and the latter has been basically completed.
According to the above review, in other periods except 1949-1950, other goals (rather than achieving reunification) occupied the primary position. Of course, from the second stage to the ninth stage, it is objectively impossible to take the realization of reunification as the primary goal.
In fact, in the general political sense, it can be said that achieving reunification is the primary goal, but there is no way to reasonably carry out specific work arrangements around goals that cannot be achieved.
There are opportunities in the tenth stage, but we still have to wait to catch up with the overall situation of accelerating development in China’s strategic opportunity period.
Don’t you want to unify?
no, it isn’t.
The most reliable judgment is that if some of the great game traditions since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (not limited to the Taiwan issue) have been effectively inherited, it should still make a difference and strategic determination, and take the realization of reunification as the “prize” to win the century marathon game against the United States.
This “lightness” may be lightness and unification, or lightness and unification. This “lightness” is not only the lightness of process implementation, but also the lightness of strategic determination.
There is no hurry in a world of great strife. Only by waiting for days and opportunities can we reap the fruits of history at the least cost.
We are qualified to be patient. After all, the balance has already tilted to us. Otherwise, why should they jump into the fire again and again?