Zhugeliang’s motive for killing another Minister of Liu Bei

Spread the love



Portrait of Zhugeliang

Before Liu Bei died of illness in Yong’an, he carefully arranged a structure of auxiliary ministers with “Liang Zheng and Yan Fu”, that is, supporting Zhugeliang and taking Li Yan, the Minister of justice, as the deputy. However, after Liu Bei’s death, Li Yan did not play the role of assistant minister. Instead, he was deposed and exiled eight years later. So why did Zhugeliang do this? What are the profound political reasons behind this decisive decision?

In the last episode, we talked about the relationship between Zhugeliang and Liu Chan. In this episode, we talk about the second relationship that Zhugeliang wants to deal with: the relationship between colleagues. In Shu, Zhugeliang had many colleagues, but the most important one was Li Yan. Why? Both of them took care of their orders and received a posthumous edict. According to the biography of the Three Kingdoms, before his death, Liu Bei “asked the Prime Minister Liang Gu to be his assistant, and the minister ordered Li Yan to be his deputy”. The biography of Li Yan also said that Li Yan “received a posthumous edict with Zhugeliang to assist the minority leader”, and Liu Bei also “took Yan as the central capital, unified internal and external military affairs, and stayed in Yongan Town”. This arrangement is very similar to the situation after sun CE’s death. According to the biography of Zhang Zhao and the biography of Zhou Yu in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, before sun CE died, sun CE had left Zhang Zhao alone. Zhou Yu also “shared the responsibility of the central guard and the long history of Zhang Zhao”. Zhugeliang’s prime minister and Zhang Zhao’s long history were both civil servants or chief executives; Both Li Yan’s central guard and Zhou Yu’s central guard were military officers or military officers. Zhou Yu and Zhang Zhao were “in charge of public affairs”, while Li Yan and Kongming were “under the imperial edict”. One martial art, one article, one pair and one Zheng are so similar! What does that mean? It shows that in Liu Bei’s mind, Li Yan is Zhou Yu, or he hopes he is Zhou Yu.

So, did Li Yan play the role of Zhou Yu?

No, Li Yan not only failed to assist Liu Chan with Zhugeliang, but also was deposed eight years later after Liu Bei became an orphan. This is totally different from Zhou Yu’s situation, and it also leaves a mystery for history. This episode is about this mystery. For this reason, we must tell the story of Li Yan’s abolition.

According to the biography of Li Yan in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, this is generally the case: in the ninth year of Jianxing of the Shu Han Dynasty (AD 231), Zhugeliang went out of the Qi mountains, attacked the Cao Wei Dynasty in the north, and arranged for Li Yan to supervise the transportation of military grain. At this time, Li Yan has changed his name to Liping (for the convenience of readers, he is still called Li Yan below), and is acting as the governor of the prime minister’s office, urging him to transport grain and grass is naturally his job. Unfortunately, Li Yan’s luck was too bad. During the summer and autumn of this year, it rained heavily, and the military grain could not be transported to the front as scheduled. So Li Yan sent people to the army to explain the situation and ideas, asked Zhugeliang to return to the Army (call Liang to return), and Zhugeliang agreed (Liang accepted to withdraw). However, when the news of Zhugeliang’s withdrawal came, Li Yan pretended to be strange and made a fuss and said, oh, there is plenty of military food. Why should we retreat? Liu Chan also said that Zhugeliang’s withdrawal was a “false retreat” with the purpose of luring the enemy deep (to lure thieves and fight). Of course, this is not true, and it will cause suspicion. Zhugeliang had no choice but to show everyone the original letters written by Li Yan. Li Yan had nothing to say at this moment (he resigned from poverty and exhausted his feelings), so he had to confess frankly and bow his head to confess his guilt (first to apologize for his guilt).

This is how Li Yan was abolished. People with a clear eye can see that his plot is suspicious. First, the criminal motive is unknown. According to the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Li Yan has to shirk his responsibility (to relieve himself of the responsibility for not doing it) and blame others (to highlight the fault of not entering). The former one makes sense, but the latter one is problematic. Li Yan’s statement clearly stated that Zhugeliang’s withdrawal was “to lure thieves and fight”. This clearly means that he lures the enemy into the deep and retreats to advance. How can it be “the fault of not advancing”? Second, the modus operandi is clumsy. If Li Yan wanted to frame Zhugeliang, he should not make such a foreword without a postscript, nor should he leave behind evidence and a handle. With Li Yanzhi’s cleverness, how could he not have imagined that Zhugeliang would “develop his own writing style in the future”? Third, there is only one side. As we know, there were no historians in Shuhan, nor did they compile anthologies for Li Yan. Therefore, we will never know Li Yan’s true thoughts and statements. However, as professor tianyuqing of Peking University said in the article “Li Yan’s Abolishment and Zhuge’s employment”, the foregoing story is “too absurd and out of line with normal circumstances”, which is really not like what Li Yan did. Therefore, Mr. Tian “doubted that there was another article”.

Of course, there are other articles. The politics of ancient China was a kind of secret politics operated in a dark box. The published materials may not necessarily represent the truth, or even cover up the truth. For example, the letter of empress Fu, I suspect it was fabricated by Cao Cao. Of course, Zhugeliang would not forge Li Yan’s letter, but it does not mean that Li Yan’s “crime” and “criminal evidence” only have these letters. In other words, there must be something wrong with Li Yan, but the problem will not be so simple.

But this is not important. First, Li Yan confessed. This shows that Zhugeliang at least grasped Li Yan’s handle. Second, all ministers support it. According to peisongzhi’s note in the annals of the Three Kingdoms – Biography of Li Yan, when Zhugeliang wrote the book, there were more than 20 co signers, including Wei Yan, Yang Yi, dengzhi, Liu Ba, Fei Yi and Jiang Wei. Therefore, Li Yan was deposed as a civilian and exiled to Zitong (county name, now Zitong County, Sichuan Province). Three years later, in the 12th year of Jianxing of Shuhan (AD 234), Li Yan heard that Zhugeliang had died, and he also fell ill and died.

The abolition of Li Yan was undoubtedly a major event for the Shuhan regime; And Rome wasn’t built in a day. In other words, Zhugeliang may have long wanted to solve the Li Yan problem. This incident only provided an opportunity. So we have a question: Why did Zhugeliang abolish Li Yan?

There are also two views. One view is that Li Yan was abolished because he fought for power and profit and killed himself. Another view is that Zhugeliang played politics to repel dissidents. This is tit for tat. We must first make clear the situation.

This is generally the case. According to the biography of Zhugeliang and the biography of Li Yan in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, after Liu Bei summoned Zhugeliang and Li Yan to Tuogu in Yong’an, Zhugeliang returned to Chengdu and Li Yan stayed in Yong’an. Liu Chan succeeded to the throne and granted Zhugeliang the title of Marquis of Wuxiang and Li Yan the title of Marquis of Duxiang. Zhugeliang set up a government to manage affairs and led the herdsmen of Yizhou; Li Yan holds the title of fake Festival (with Shangfang sword) and jiaguangluxun (captain of gongtingwei). In the fourth year of Jianxing (AD 226), Li Yan was promoted from general Fu Han to former general. Fuhan general is a “Miscellaneous general” with a lower level. The former general is a “famous general” with a higher level. Moreover, the former general was a position held by Guan Yu, which gave Li Yan enough face. In the eighth year of Jianxing (AD 230), Li Yan was promoted from a former general to an Hussars general. According to the records of 100 officials in the later Han Dynasty and notes, among the generals, the most important is the general, followed by the Hussar general, the cavalry general, the guard general, and the front, rear, left and right generals. The top general and the Hussar general are “prime ministers”, while the cavalry general, the general of Wei, and the front, rear, left and right generals are “prime ministers”. Li Yan was promoted from a former general to a Hussars general, and his position rose one step further. And his son Li Feng was also appointed governor of Jiangzhou to command the Jiangzhou army.

So what’s the problem?

On the surface, Li Yan has been promoted step by step. But compared with Zhugeliang, it is inferior everywhere. First of all, Zhugeliang was in the Dynasty and Li Yan was outside. Zhugeliang was close to the monarch and took charge of the Court Affairs. He the final say (no matter how big or small the political affairs were, they were decided by Liang). Li Yan could not say a word. In fact, since Li Yan stayed in Yong’an town (today’s Fengjie) and later moved to Jiangzhou (today’s Chongqing), it can be said that he has been far away from the political center and power center. This is unfavorable to Li Yan. Because he was far away from Chengdu, he was unable to participate in the imperial government, difficult to assist the minority leaders, alienated the officialdom, and lost the opportunity to perform. He didn’t do anything to fight in the north and south, nor did he do anything to recommend talents; People at all levels are indifferent to each other, and it is unlikely to make a name for themselves. In the present words, Li Yan is in danger of being “marginalized”. He was defeated in the bureaucratic struggle, which is a potential reason.

There is obviously a mystery in it. That is why Li Yan did not join the court? Was he unwilling, or did Zhugeliang refuse? After Tuogu, Zhugeliang returned to Chengdu to preside over the imperial court, and Li Yan stayed in Yong’an to guard the border. From the words “take Yan as the central capital, unify the internal and external military, and stay in Yong’an”, this should be Liu Bei’s arrangement. So why did Liu Bei arrange this? Is this a temporary arrangement or a long-term one? If it is temporary, why not change it later? If it is long-term, what is Liu Bei’s idea? Unfortunately, we have no idea about all this.

What is certain is that Li Yan, who also cares for his life, cannot compare with Zhugeliang in many aspects. For example, Zhugeliang had his own administrative organ and bureaucratic system (opening the government and governing Affairs), but Li Yan did not; Zhugeliang also served as a local official (leading Yizhou herdsman), and Li Yan could not. With one in the imperial court and the other outside, Li Yan was clearly compared. This, of course, causes injustice. So Li Yan thought, you, the minister who takes care of his life, can also serve as the state shepherd. Can’t I, the vice minister, be an assassin? However, at that time, there was only one state in Shuhan, that is, Yizhou. Can’t there be both state herdsmen and assassins in one state? But Li Yan also has a way. According to the annals of the Three Kingdoms – Biography of Li Yan and the annals of Huayang, after Li Yan moved to Jiangzhou, he proposed to the imperial court that five counties should be set up with Jiangzhou as the center, and another Bazhou should be set up to be the governor of Bazhou. As a result, the Prime Minister Zhugeliang refused. This, of course, made Li Yan unhappy. A few years later, Li Yan asked the imperial court to open the government again. The reason is also very legitimate: in the Wei Dynasty, the four ministers who jointly assisted Cao Rui, Emperor Ming of Wei, Cao Zhen, Chen Qun, Cao Xiu and Sima Yi, were all founded. As a result, the request was rejected. However, Zhugeliang also compensated Li Yan by recommending Li Feng, Li Yan’s son, as the governor of Jiangzhou to improve his treatment.

This is the outline of the relationship between Li Yan and Zhugeliang. According to this, some historians believe that Li Yan was abolished because of his own fault. Why? Because Li Yan, as a minister who cares for his life, did not give advice to build the country, nor did he spend his life and death defending the country, but he only fought for power and profit, used power for personal gain, and used all means. For example, when did he “ask five prefectures to be the governor of Bazhou”? It was about the fifth year of Jianxing in Shuhan (AD 227). At that time, Cao Pi, Emperor Wen of Wei, had died, and Cao Rui, Emperor Ming of Wei, had succeeded to the throne. Zhugeliang wanted to send Li Yanzhi’s troops to Hanzhong in order to carry out the northern expedition. After receiving the order, Li Yan pushed through obstacles and procrastinated, but asked to set aside five prefectures to establish Bazhou and let him be an assassin. This is not a bargain what is it? In the eighth year of the reign of emperor Jianxing (AD 230), Zhugeliang prepared to go west out of Qishan mountain and planned to let Li Yanzhen guard Hanzhong. Li Yan took the opportunity to talk about Sima Yi and others’ founding. In fact, he was talking about himself through Sima Yi. This is not extortion, what is it?

What is more serious is that according to the notes of peisongzhi in the annals of the Three Kingdoms – Biography of Li Yan quoting the collection of Zhugeliang, Li Yan had written to Zhugeliang to persuade him to “accept Jiuxi and become a knight and King”, but he was rejected. Why did Li Yan encourage Zhugeliang to become king? One possibility is to encourage others to be officials for their own sake. There is another possibility, that is, to get caught up in injustice. As we said in the last episode, Zhugeliang’s power and position at this time were quite similar to that of Cao Cao. Caocao was appointed Marquis of the county (Marquis Wuping). He was the Prime Minister of the county. He started the government to govern affairs and led the State animal husbandry (Jizhou animal husbandry). Zhugeliang was also a Marquis of Jufeng county (Marquis of Wuxiang). He was the Prime Minister of the county. He started the government and governed the affairs, and led the State animal husbandry (Yizhou animal husbandry). If there is another person who receives Jiuxi and is called a certain king, it will be exactly the same as Cao Cao. Obviously, no matter what possible, Li Yan has no good intentions.

It seems that Li Yan’s character is very suspicious. Therefore, Mr. Yu Mingxia’s biography of Zhugeliang said that Li Yan was “completely a treacherous, selfish, sinister and cruel villain who did not attach importance to state affairs”. It is natural to depose him.

But there are two things about this. First, the so-called Li Yan was selfish (running his own family), abusing favors (still a small favor), fishing for fame (seeking fame) and not focusing on state affairs (not worrying about the country). It was just a one-sided statement of Zhugeliang, lacking evidence. Second, Li Yan didn’t play the role of assistant minister because he was not in the court and couldn’t work hard. I can’t blame him. Third, Li Yan’s request to be an assassin and to open a government can not simply be said to be a struggle for power and profit, running for official positions and seeking official positions. Because the power, status and treatment of his “Deputy Minister” are far from that of the “minister who is taking care of his life”. Therefore, in his article “the abolition of Li Yan”, Mr. Yin Yungong believed that Li Yan was striving for and defending his legitimate rights and interests “openly and confidently”. For this reason, Li Yan even came up with a bad idea to persuade Zhugeliang to “accept Jiuxi and become a grand duke”. In Mr. Yin’s view, Li Yan’s move was “intended to embarrass Zhugeliang”. As a result, Zhugeliang was “terrified” and had to reply immediately. Zhugeliang said that if Cao Wei was exterminated, Cao Rui was killed, and you were granted the title together, I would dare to accept even ten tin, not to mention nine tin (although ten lives can be accepted, it is also due to nine evils)? This is a righteous statement, but it is also a taboo. What is “ten lives”? Cao Cao was scolded half to death by everyone after only nine lives; What would happen if Zhugeliang really took ten lives?

This also shows Li Yan’s urgency. In the eyes of those who supported Zhugeliang, this was a “rampant attack”. However, in the eyes of those who agree with Li Yan, it is no harm to say that it is an “action to safeguard rights”. Mr. yinyungong believed that Li Yan had seen that Zhugeliang “did not pay attention to his orphan colleague” and “pushed out, suppressed and snubbed” his deputy everywhere, but also “restrained” him from time to time. Of course, Li Yan would “not show weakness, not be convinced, not buy an account, and wait for an opportunity to attack”.

Some people may ask why Zhugeliang could not give Li Yan some power? Mr. yinyungong believed that Zhugeliang was a “politician with a strong desire for power”. His style of work is “monopolizing power without dispersing small power” (according to the so-called “no matter how big or small a political matter is, it is decided by the light”). Even if they were both Tuogu, they had to put it on the shelf, and Li Yan refused to accept this. In other words, Li Yan’s tragedy lies in his unwillingness to be a nominal minister who cares for his life, while “Zhugeliang, who has a strong will for power,” simply does not want and does not allow others to meddle with the supreme power, which is incompatible with fire and water. As a result, “Zhugeliang, who was good at playing power”, caught “Li Yan’s fault of sending him to the door”, knocked him to the ground as soon as he shot, and never turned over again.

okay. Now we have two very different opinions. According to the view of historians represented by Mr. yumingxia, the essence of the dispute between Yan and Liang was Li Yan’s rampant attack for power and profit. Zhugeliang gave in to the overall situation. Its struggle track is: attack, tolerance; Attack again and be patient again; Until Li Yan exposed himself and killed himself. On the contrary, according to the view of historians represented by Mr. Yin Yungong, the essence of the struggle between Yan and Liang was that Zhugeliang was unauthorized and eager to suppress his colleagues, and Li Yan rose up to defend his rights and fight on grounds. Its struggle track is: suppression, resistance; We will continue to suppress and fight until Li Yan starts his career badly.

This is so interesting.

Yumingxia and yinyungong are both rigorous historians. The materials they base on are all recorded in official history. They do not joke about it, and what they say is not unreasonable. However, their conclusions are quite different. What does that mean? It shows that the way to look at historical events in terms of character and morality is impassable. It’s no good talking about things as they are. We know that the fuse of unrest is often something small. There must be a big reason behind a small event. Moreover, Zhugeliang was a great politician. As the leader of the Shuhan regime, he must have considered the overall situation. Therefore, even if Li Yan is identified as a villain and a “villain”, it will belittle Zhugeliang’s superficial view to regard Zhugeliang and his struggle as a struggle between a gentleman and a villain. Besides, it is hard to say whether Li Yan is a villain.

So what is the overall situation that Zhugeliang is considering?

This must be traced back to Liu Bei’s Yong’an Tuogu. That is to say, why did Liu Bei arrange Li Yan, who was called the “second Fiddler” by Mr. Yin Yungong, when he was supporting the orphan? As everyone knows, Liu Bei was a “world leader”. He fought all his life, was well-informed and thoughtful. His arrangement was certainly not made at one time, but out of deep consideration. The question is simply: what is Liu Bei thinking about?

Mr. tianyuqing answered the “Goldbach conjecture”. According to Mr. Tian’s book “four topics in the history of Shu”, the arrangement of “highlighting the upright and strict deputy” is to eliminate hidden dangers and consolidate political power; The greatest hidden trouble and disaster of the Shuhan regime lies not in the Cao Wei and Sun Wu dynasties, but within the Shuhan regime. It is this internal contradiction that makes Liu Bei’s Tuogu unusual.

So we have to ask: is that so?

Yes. As we know, the Shuhan dynasty or regime established by Liu Bei was composed of three political forces. The first is the “local forces”, including the Yizhou bureaucrats in Luoyang and the local giants in Yizhou. We collectively call them “Yizhou group”. The second share is “Liu Zhang’s former headquarters”, including those who followed Liu Yan’s father and son to Sichuan and later joined Liu Zhang. We collectively call it “Dongzhou group”. The third share is “Liu Bei’s trusted followers”, including Liu Bei’s backbones (such as Guan Yu and Zhang Fei) and those who later joined Liu Bei (such as Ma Chao), which we collectively call “Jingzhou group”. These three forces, due to a first come first served relationship, have formed a complex contradiction between the old and the new, between the subject and the object. When Liuyan and his son came to Sichuan, Yizhou group was the leader and the old; Dongzhou group is a customer and a new one. Between the old and the new, the host and guest once met with swordsmen. After Liu Bei entered Shu, his relations changed. Dongzhou group, which was originally a customer and a new one, has become a master and an old one. The contradiction between the old and the new became the contradiction between the Jingzhou group and the Yizhou and Dongzhou groups; The contradictions between the Dongzhou and Yizhou groups still exist. Liu Bei’s Shu Han regime was built on these three contradictions, which is not a funny thing.

What’s less interesting is that Liu Bei suffered a crushing defeat in Yiling and Yiting, which inevitably made some people who were already dissatisfied ready to move. According to the annals of Huayang, after Liu Bei’s defeat in Yong’an, he fell ill in November, and in December Huang Yuan, the governor of Hanjia, rebelled (he was suppressed in March the next year). According to the biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, after the death of Liu Bei, all the counties in the south central region were rebellious. It can be said that the foundation of Liu Bei’s founding was not solid; Yiling was defeated and the earth shook.

This is undoubtedly something that worries Liu Bei deeply, and Zhugeliang is the only one who can share his worries. This is the reason why Liu Bei wanted to “ask the Prime Minister for help”. So why take Li Yan as a deputy? Because the other two forces cannot be ignored. In other words, among the so-called “old people”, there should also be representatives, and Li Yan is the most appropriate. According to the biography of Li Yan in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Li Yan was originally a native of Jingzhou (Nanyang). He used to work under Liu Biao, and became famous for his ability for a time. When Cao Cao went south, Liu Cong surrendered, but Li Yan went west and defected to Liu Zhang. When Liu Bei entered Shu, Li Yan led the crowd to surrender to Liu Bei. Therefore, Liu Bei selected Li Yan, in addition to the “old ministers in Sichuan should be rewarded and comforted” proposed by he Zhuo in the Qing Dynasty; “Jing earth returns to Cao, and Yan only returns to the west”; In addition to the three reasons of “managing the army by the people and doing a good job, I am afraid it is also because he has the best and closest relationship with Liu Bei’s” Jingzhou group “among the so-called” old people “.

Of course, what is more important is his representativeness. As mentioned earlier, the Shuhan regime is composed of three political forces, and these three political forces have different weight in Liu Bei’s heart. From the structure of the regime at that time, it is not difficult to see that Jingzhou group was the main body of the regime, Dongzhou group was the object of unity, and Yizhou group was the object of prevention. This is not surprising, because the Jingzhou group headed by Liu Bei is a new external force. In order to gain a firm foothold in Yizhou, they have to unite and rely on foreign forces who came earlier than them. This is the Dongzhou group. Dongzhou group is half new and half old. It is both a customer and a host. It can just play a role in communicating between the old and the new. In this way, Li Yan, who belongs to the Dongzhou group and is close to the Jingzhou group, became the candidate Liu Bei had high hopes for.

As a matter of fact, Liu Bei had a deep intention in this arrangement. First of all, it embodies the basic principles of dealing with the relationship between the old and the new. Although there is no written record of this principle, it is not difficult to see from the appointment of officials of the Shuhan regime that “from behind, we can not be reversed; we are the main, compatible with the three parties”. Because we should “focus on ourselves”, Zhugeliang is right; Li Yan is the vice president because he wants to be “compatible with three parties”. That is to say, Liu Bei left his political will by means of personnel arrangement. This was also the reason why Zhugeliang was able to abolish the political confidence of another minister, who defied the principle of “catching up from behind”.

But this is only “first” and “second”. The second is Liu Bei’s “imperial mind”. According to the biography of Li Yan, the biography of the first lord and the biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Liu Bei summoned Li Yan to Yong’an and worshipped him as a minister order in the second year of Zhangwu (AD 222), and the month was October. Zhugeliang was called to Yong’an in February of the second year, the third year of Zhangwu (223 AD). According to the time when the two men arrived in Yong’an and the words “Yan and Zhugeliang were both under the imperial edict”, when Liu Bei said to Zhugeliang, “if you are not talented, you can take it yourself”, Li Yan was probably present, or at least informed. This is very interesting. What’s the point? On the one hand, Liu Bei is telling Li Yan that Zhugeliang is the person I trust most and that he can “take care of himself”. Don’t challenge his position! As a representative of the “old people”, Li Yan may not only maintain the relationship between the old and the new, but also promote the change of the old people. This is a double-edged sword. We must take precautions. Therefore, Mr. tianyuqing believed that Zhugeliang’s role was Zhong Kui, who beat ghosts, and that “this ghost is Li Yan”.

However, in my “villain’s opinion”, I’m afraid it’s not that simple. In other words, Li Yan may not understand it that way. Li Yan is likely to think that Liu Bei is “using his two skills as a king to deal with his two skills as a minister”. Otherwise, why should he stay in Yong’an town? It was just a hint that if Zhugeliang really replaced Liu Chan, Li Yan could send troops from Yong’an to serve the king. This is Li Yan’s political strength to dare to compete with Zhugeliang. Because of this, he asked to open his government and become the governor of Bazhou. He wrote a letter to Zhugeliang to accept Jiuxi and the Duke of Jin to become king, that is, to see if Zhugeliang had a “heart of no surrender”. He believed that this was the execution of Liu Bei’s political will, so he was justifiable.

Of course, these are guesses. We are still willing to believe in good faith that Liu Bei’s wish is just that new people and old people work together and that the three groups of Jingzhou, Dongzhou and Yizhou work together.

Now it seems that although Liu Bei has made good intentions, his wishes are still somewhat unfulfilled. On the one hand, Zhugeliang’s hands were too tight and he was only willing to give up his fame and power. On the other hand, Li Yan’s performance was disappointing. First, they think highly of themselves and are difficult to work with. At that time, there was a saying in the folk proverb that “it is difficult to have sex with Li, but Li scales and armor” meant that Li Yan had scales and armor on his body, and could not be touched easily (the villagers thought it was inaccessible). This is recorded in the biography of Jiang Biao and the biography of Chen Zhen in the annals of the Three Kingdoms cited in the Taiping imperial survey. The second is to sow dissension from time to time. According to the biography of Chen Zhen in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Zhugeliang wrote a letter to Jiang Wan and Dong Yun, saying that I thought Li Yan was just uncooperative and didn’t provoke him (I thought he was a scaly man but not a criminal). I didn’t expect that he would have a “Su Zhang affair”. The so-called “Su Zhang affair” means “shuttle diplomacy” like Su Qin and Zhang Yi. This undermines stability and unity within the regime. Third, support the soldiers and respect themselves, and compete against each other. For example, if he wanted to be the governor of Bazhou, Zhugeliang thought that he wanted to establish an independent kingdom. In Zhugeliang’s view, his request for the opening of the government was even more confrontational to the central government.

This put Zhugeliang in a dilemma. Zhugeliang knew that as a prime minister, his job was to consolidate the position of the new, stabilize the emotions of the old, coordinate the old and new relations, and eliminate the old and new boundaries. This is the reason why he gave way to Li Yan again and again. However, unity cannot be unprincipled. Since Li Yan provoked the principle of “taking me as the main and catching up from behind”, he could only dismiss him under the pretext that it was “unbelievable” (Mr. tianyuqing said).

Now we can draw a conclusion that Zhugeliang deposed Li Yan for immediate, remote, superficial and fundamental reasons. The fundamental reason is the internal contradictions of the Shuhan regime composed of three political forces: Yizhou, Dongzhou and Jingzhou; In the final analysis, Zhugeliang resolutely deposed Li Yan in order to solve this contradiction once and for all and implement the rule of law. Governing Shu by law was the fundamental policy of Zhugeliang to solve the old and new contradictions. For this reason, as early as the first northern expedition, he punished Ma Su, who had missed the Street Pavilion, and asked for punishment. This incident, of course, reflects the fairness of Zhugeliang’s law enforcement and the clear distinction between reward and punishment, but it is not so simple. So, what is the article behind Zhugeliang’s “cutting ma Su with tears”?

In 263 A.D., the surrender of Liu Chan’s monarchs and ministers without war is the last unsolved mystery in the history of Shu Han. Among them, the one who played an important role was doctor Guanglu qiaozhou, who had a position and no right. Why did qiaozhou urge to surrender to Cao Wei? Why did Liu Chan listen to him? Why did only a few people advocate resistance and most people have no fighting spirit? What are the political backgrounds and reasons behind the rapid demise of the Shu Han Dynasty?

Shuhan was the first to perish among the Three Kingdoms, which puzzled many historians. First, historians generally believe that, compared with the Caowei and Sunwu, if Shuhan is the best governed, how can it die first? Second, Shu has a “strong sense of danger” (recorded in the biography of dengzhi in the annals of the Three Kingdoms). If you can’t beat others, can you still hold on? Third, it took only two months from the dispatch of troops in the Wei Dynasty to the surrender of Liu Chan. Why did the Shuhan perish so quickly? This is really puzzling.

But confusion is confusion, and thinking is thinking. Generally, there are also four conclusions, namely, Liu Chan was fatuous, Huang Hao was obsessed with power, Chen Zhi (sound branch) was disorderly in politics, and Qiao Zhou was misguided. This is also well founded. As we know, the Wei army set out from Luoyang in August of the fourth year of Jingyuan period (263 A.D., the first half of this year was the sixth year of Jingyao period in Shu Han, and the second half was the first year of Yanxing period in Shu Han); The decision to cut Shu was made in May. According to the biography of Jiang Wei in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Jiang Wei had received the news, so he told Liu Chan to put forward defense measures (six years later, the leader of the Three Kingdoms), and asked Liu Chan to quickly send Zhang Yi and Liao Hua to guard the Yangan pass and the Yinping bridge respectively “in case of accidents”. Who knows at this time, Liu Chan only listens to Huang Hao, and Huang Hao only listens to wizards. When the wizard said that the enemy would not fight, Huang Hao believed it and asked Liu Chan to withhold the official document (the matter of the Lord’s bedroom). As a result, the civil and military officials of the whole dynasty did not know that a catastrophe was imminent (the ministers did not know). Isn’t it that Liu Chan is fatuous and Huang Hao has power?

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *