Zhugeliang’s truth: no emperor dream, no sword to kill Guan Yu

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Portrait of Zhugeliang

Ancient people like to deify Zhugeliang, while modern people tend to demonize Zhugeliang. Zhuziyan, a professor at Shanghai University, said that “Zhugeliang killed Guan Yu with a knife”; Hu juezhao, a retired teacher in Shaanxi, believed that “Zhugeliang wanted to be emperor”. At first glance, these views sound reasonable, but they simply cannot stand further scrutiny.

(I) “emperor dream” is not Zhugeliang’s pursuit

Hu juezhao, a retired professor, wrote that Zhugeliang dreamed of being an emperor. The reasons are as follows: first, Zhugeliang once told Du Wei, a reclusive expert, that he would lead the people of Shuhan to recuperate and wait until Cao Pi was frustrated. But later, Zhugeliang suddenly changed his mind and presented Liu Chan with the “graduation watch”. This kind of belligerent behavior regardless of the people’s life and death is to realize Zhugeliang’s ambition to be an emperor. Second, Li Yan persuaded Zhugeliang to seal Jiuxi, and Zhugeliang replied to Li Yan that if the Cao Wei could be eliminated, even ten lives would be acceptable, not to mention nine? This shows that Zhugeliang wanted to learn from Wang Mang and become emperor by adding nine tin. Third, Zhugeliang once claimed to be “solitary” in front of the courtiers of the Shu Han Dynasty, and this “solitary” is generally the emperor’s claim, indicating that Zhugeliang has regarded himself as the emperor.

In my opinion, none of Professor Hu’s three arguments can be established. So its conclusion is also very absurd.

First, Zhugeliang gave up the policy of recuperation because Cao Pi suddenly died of illness, which made Zhugeliang see the opportunity of the northern expedition. This is consistent with his thought of “wait for its setback, and then attack it”. Therefore, Zhugeliang’s strategic change should not be regarded as a sign of his desire to be an emperor.

In fact, not only Zhugeliang thought that Cao Pi’s death was a good opportunity for the northern expedition. Previously, Sun Quan also made the decision of * Cao Rui. The reason why Zhugeliang decided to make the northern expedition was also because of the cooperation of the eastern Wu.

Second, from the content of Zhugeliang’s reply to Li Yan, Zhugeliang not only did not mean to be an emperor, but also showed a strong thought of “loyalty to the emperor”. The contents of Zhugeliang’s original letter are as follows:

I have known each other for a long time, but I can’t solve each other again! The next step is to enlighten the country and discipline it, so that you will not be silent. I was originally a corporal of the East, but I mistakenly used it for the former Emperor. I was a minister of extreme people, and I was rewarded with tens of billions of money. Now I have no effect in asking for thieves, and my confidants have not answered. It is not my righteousness to spoil Qi and Jin, and sit on my dignity. If Wei zhanrui is destroyed, the emperor will return to his former residence and rise with the sons. Although ten lives can be accepted, the situation is in nine evils! (records of the Three Kingdoms. Biography of Li Yan quoted Zhugeliang set)

Although Zhugeliang’s letter contains “although ten lives can be accepted, the situation is in nine evils!” But there are no words like “nine tin” and “ten tin”. “Nine tin” originally meant “nine kinds of orders”. However, after Wang Mang usurped the throne with the title of “nine tin”, it is easy to associate “nine tin” with being an emperor. In fact, there is a difference between the two. The reason why Zhugeliang said “Kuang Yu Jiu Xie” instead of “Kuang Yu Jiu Xi Xie” was to emphasize that he recognized the “nine kinds of orders”, so as to avoid people mistakenly thinking that he wanted to use “Jiu Xi” to usurp the throne of the emperor. Take another look at the other half of the sentence “although ten orders can be accepted”, which clearly states the meaning of “ten orders”, and has no connection with the word “tin”.

The translation of Zhugeliang’s letter to Li Yan is: I have known you for a long time, and I didn’t want to explain this to you again. Next, you taught me to recover the country and warned me not to be bound by rules. It seems that there is not enough tacit understanding between you and me. I was originally a civilian in the East, and was loved by the emperor. Now I have been a supreme minister, with a reward of 10 billion. It is really an unjust idea to imitate Qi and Jin Dynasties and sit at the top of their dignity, even though the previous emperor’s confidant’s kindness has not been repaid. If we can destroy Cao Wei, kill Cao Rui, and let the emperor return to his former residence, we can be promoted together. At that time, not to mention nine lives, even ten lives can be accepted.

In this letter, we only see the content of loyalty and achievements. What is the meaning of “wanting to be an emperor” in it?.

There is also a very simple truth: if Zhugeliang wrote his intention to be an emperor in his letters, how dare he spread his letters? Isn’t he afraid of being harmful to his own descendants?

Third, “loneliness” is not the emperor’s self proclaimed, “loneliness” is not to be regarded as the emperor.

The Emperor didn’t call himself “lonely”, but “I”. “Gu” is a claim of a lord, and a state shepherd can be called “Gu”. Yuan Shao once wrote a message to gongsunzan when he was a pastor in Jizhou: “alone with your feet, you have the old essentials of the former alliance…”.

Liu Bei said to Zhugeliang when he was a herdsman in Yuzhou, “being alone does not measure virtue and strength…”, and to Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, “being alone has Kongming, just like a fish has water.”

Youzhou Mu Liu Yu was loyal to Emperor Xian of Han Dynasty and refused yuan Shaoqing’s request to be emperor. He said, “I’m orphaned by the grace of the country…”.

To sum up, we believe that Professor Hu juezhao’s assertion that “Zhugeliang wanted to be emperor” is completely wrong.

(II) Zhugeliang cannot kill Guan Yu with a knife

In the autumn of the 24th year of Jian’an (AD 219), Guan Yu led the main force of Jingzhou to attack Fancheng, and Cao Ren, Cao Cao’s general for the south, was trapped in the city. Cao Cao sent Yu Jin and pound to help Cao Ren, but “all seven armies were lost” due to days of rainstorm and flood. Guan Yu took advantage of the geographical advantage and high ship to sweep away the remnants of Cao Jun, and achieved an impressive record of catching the ban and beheading pound. But soon after, Sun Quan secretly colluded with Cao Cao. Sun Quan sent troops to attack Jingzhou quietly, while Cao Cao continuously increased troops to assist Fancheng. As a result, Guan Yu’s situation took a sharp turn. He was not only defeated by General Xu Huang of Cao Jun, but also attacked Jingzhou by general Lu Meng of Wu. In January of the 25th year of Jian’an, Guan Yu was captured and killed by Wu soldiers in extreme poverty.

It took about half a year from the battle of Fancheng to Guan Yu’s capture. During this period, Sun Quan and Cao Cao sent their main forces to attack Guan Yu. However, Liu Bei did not send a single soldier to assist Guan Yu. This seems too hard to imagine.

Zhang Taiyan, a master of traditional Chinese culture, once speculated that Zhugeliang might want to use the hand of Wu people to get rid of Guan Yu, an arrogant general. But later, he denied this speculation and made a more peaceful inference: the defeat of Jingzhou should be attributed to Liu Bei’s “carelessness”.

The speculation denied by Mr. Zhang was later caught by Mr. zhuziyan, a professor at Shanghai University. Mr. zhuziyan believed that Zhugeliang was the culprit of the loss of Jingzhou and the death of Guan Yu. It was Zhugeliang who killed Guan Yu with the help of Cao and sun.

Professor zhuziyan pointed out when talking about Zhugeliang’s “behavior” of killing people with a knife: Cao Cao and Sun Quan secretly joined hands to attack Guan Yu with absolute superiority. As Liu Bei’s “military division”, Zhugeliang did not remind Liu Bei of the “dangerous situation” in Jingzhou at any time, so that Liu Bei did not send troops to assist Guan Yu. Therefore, Zhugeliang deliberately wanted to send Guan Yu to the guillotine.

According to Professor Zhu’s logic, Zhugeliang did not remind Liu Bei of the “dangerous situation” in Jingzhou, and did not fulfill the duties of a “military master”. In that case, Liu Bei should condemn Zhugeliang’s “dereliction of duty”. However, according to historical records, Liu Bei not only did not condemn Zhugeliang’s “Inaction”, but also promoted Zhugeliang to the position of prime minister. Is it because Zhugeliang’s “little action” was too hidden that he deceived Liu Bei? But why did professor zhuziyan discover Zhugeliang’s “sinister intentions” after more than 1700 years? Is it because Liu Bei is too stupid and Professor Zhu is too clever? But not only did Liu Bei not blame Zhugeliang for Guan Yu’s death, but no one in the Liu Bei group blamed Zhugeliang. So all the parties are not as smart as Professor Zhu, a scholar?

The author believes that Professor Zhu should respect historical data and evidence even if he is the “smart” of unprecedented and future generations. However, we found that what Professor Zhu said was subjective speculation. Professor Zhu thinks he is smart because he underestimates Liu Bei’s IQ.

According to historical records, although Zhugeliang was once a “military general”, this is only a brand name. Liu Bei knew that Zhugeliang’s specialty was political management, so he did not let this “military division” play a role in the military field.

Since Zhugeliang came out of the mountain, he has only come up with a military plan for Liu Bei, which was also rejected by Liu Bei. It was in the 13th year of Jian’an, when Liu Cong surrendered to Cao Cao and Liu Bei was in Xiangyang, Zhugeliang suggested attacking Xiangyang and Taking Jingzhou. When this plan was rejected by Liu Bei, Zhugeliang did not come up with a military plan for Liu Bei. Although Zhugeliang later offered to go to Jiangdong for negotiation, it was mainly Lu Su’s suggestion; Although Zhu Geliang later advised Liu Bei not to borrow land from Sun Quan, this was not a military plan, and it was also rejected by Liu Bei. In a word, Zhugeliang has been “speechless” in the military field for a long time. Of course, this is not Zhugeliang’s will, but Liu Bei’s arrangement.

Liu Bei didn’t let Zhu Geliang act as a “military adviser”, on the one hand, because the internal affairs work needed Zhu Geliang to do, on the other hand, because Liu Bei already had the right counselors.

Liu Bei used two advisers in his life, one was Pang Tong and the other was FA Zheng. Liu Bei won the battle of Yizhou thanks to Pang Tong’s clever plan; Liu Bei’s victory in Hanzhong was mainly due to FA Zheng. FA Zheng did not have title of the “military master”, but Liu Bei took him as “master of the plan”. It can be seen that Liu Bei did not arrange his work strictly according to his “title”.

Although Zhugeliang is called “General of military division”, his actual work is mainly: collecting taxes, conscription and grain transportation, maintaining public order, taking charge of criminal law, punishing “infidelity”, eliminating “internal enemies”, and so on. In short, Zhugeliang’s work belongs to internal affairs management, and military planning is not within the scope of Zhugeliang’s work.

There is a sentence in the annals of the Three Kingdoms. The biography of the first lord: “the first lord regained the leadership of Yizhou animal husbandry, Zhugeliang as the forearm, FA Zheng as the master, Guan Yu, Zhang Fei, Ma Chao as the minions, and Xu Jing, Mozhu, and Jian Yong as guest friends.” Professor zhuziyan said: since Zhugeliang is a shareholder, he is the first adviser of Liu Bei group and should be responsible for Guan Yu’s death. Here, Professor Zhu obviously did not understand the meaning of “guhumerus” and mistakenly thought that “guhumerus” was the meaning of the first adviser. In fact, “thigh and humerus” means “arm and thigh”, which means “group pillar”, and does not specifically mean “military pillar”. And “master” means “first adviser”.

Of course, although Zhu Geliang’s job responsibilities did not include military planning, he had the opportunity to discover the “dangerous situation” in Jingzhou. After all, he has lived and worked in Jingzhou for many years, and he has also dealt with Sun Quan. He should understand Sun Quan’s means. Unfortunately, due to his busy internal affairs work and Sun Quan’s use of a series of deceptions, he gave up his vigilance to the Soochow, thus losing the opportunity to remind Liu Bei to take precautions. From this perspective, Zhugeliang was also responsible for Guan Yu’s death, but it was by no means the main responsibility.

In fact, as early as the spring of the 22nd year of Jian’an, Sun Quan secretly surrendered to Cao Cao. As the biography of Sun Quan in the annals of the Three Kingdoms said, “in the spring of the 22nd year of Jian’an, Quan ordered the lieutenant Xu Xiangyi, Cao Gong, to surrender, the official Gazette was repaired, and he vowed to remarry.” However, Sun Quan did a very good job in keeping secrets about the surrender of Cao Cao, and Liu Bei did not find him until the eve of his sneak attack on Jingzhou.

In order to keep this secret, Sun Quan was especially kind to Ma Liang, the messenger sent by Liu Bei. In the words of the biography of Ma Liang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Sun Quan was “respectful” to Ma Liang. In addition, Sun Quan also approved zhugejin’s request to pass on his second son zhugeqiao to Zhugeliang. This made Liu Bei group think that Sun Quan really “repaired” the sun Liu alliance.

It was precisely because the Liu Bei group underestimated the possibility of Sun Quan’s surrender that Liu Bei confidently and boldly called himself the “king of Hanzhong”, causing a group of subordinates to work around him, thus ignoring the “danger” of Jingzhou.

It was Liu Bei’s idea to call himself “the king of Hanzhong”, and Zhugeliang and FA were both his loyal supporters. Therefore, Liu Bei himself should be the first to be held responsible for the loss of Jingzhou and the death of Guan Yu. At the same time, both FA Zheng and Zhugeliang also bear minor responsibilities. But Liu Bei did not even admit his primary responsibility, and certainly would not blame Zhugeliang for his secondary responsibility.

For the defeat of Jingzhou, Liu Bei group agreed that it was the result of Sun Quan’s treachery. Liu Bei did not want to find the reason for the defeat of Jingzhou from his own perspective. Because Liu Bei believed that he was the victim, while Sun Quan violated the rules of the game agreed by both sides.

In general, although Zhugeliang was indirectly responsible for Guan Yu’s death, he could not kill Guan Yu with a knife. Because Zhugeliang did not expect Sun Quan to surrender to Cao Cao at all. Even Ma Liang, the envoy sent by Liu Bei to the eastern Wu, was deceived by Sun Quan, not to mention Zhugeliang, who was concentrating on internal affairs?

Professor zhuziyan also pointed out that Liu Bei and Zhugeliang had a full month to rescue Guan Yu. His basis is as follows: Guan Yu was captured and killed in December of the 24th year of Jian’an, while “fan you, the governor of Yidu set by Liu Bei, the king of Hanzhong, abandoned the city and fled, and ran back to Chengdu in November of the 24th year of Jian’an. Fan Youding reported the news of the fall of Jingzhou to Liu Bei and Zhugeliang.

Professor Zhu’s basis may not be tenable. From November to December, does it have to be one month apart? If it is from the end of November to the beginning of December, the distance between them is only a few days. So Professor Zhu’s inference is not rigorous.

Professor zhuziyan pointed out when talking about Zhugeliang’s “motive” of killing people with a knife: in the battle of Chibi, Zhugeliang established miraculous achievements, which caused Guan Yu’s jealousy; Because Zhugeliang was worried about his special relationship with the Lord “enruo brother”, and he went to Liu Bei much later than Guan Yu, and his official position was lower than Guan Yu, he had to deal with him in vain. What Zhugeliang considered was to fundamentally solve the problem and wait for the opportunity to remove Guan Yu.

It is true that Zhugeliang adopted the strategy of “falsely cooperating with the snake and skillfully dealing with Guan Yu”, but it is nonsense to say that Guan Yu is jealous of Zhugeliang. Zhugeliang did not make “miraculous achievements” in the battle of Chibi, and the reward he received after the war was far lower than that of Guan Yu. Therefore, there is no need for Guan Yu to envy Zhugeliang. The reason why Guan Yu wrote a letter to ask Zhugeliang: what is the level of Ma Chao? This shows that in Guan Yu’s eyes, Zhugeliang is a very fair person. In other words, Guan Yu not only did not envy Zhugeliang, but also respected Zhugeliang.

In short, Guan Yu, as a military general guarding one side, will not hinder Zhugeliang’s promotion for the time being. Zhugeliang’s real competitor is not Guan Yu, but Fazheng. Law is Liu Bei’s “master”, and he once put forward different opinions on Zhugeliang’s “severe punishment and law”. But even so, Zhugeliang never thought of “getting rid of” Fa Zheng. On the contrary, he once connived at FA Zheng’s “indiscriminate killing of innocent people”.

Guan Yu and FA are Liu Bei’s confidants. Even if they make serious mistakes, Liu Bei will not do anything to them. Zhugeliang knew this well, so he never had a direct conflict with them. This also shows that Zhugeliang was cautious by nature and never did dangerous things. Then, how dare he do such a dangerous thing as “killing Guan Yu with a knife”?

Zhugeliang did not commit the crime of “framing” Guan Yu, but he committed the crime of “indulgence”. Because Zhugeliang never pointed out Guan Yu’s shortcomings, Guan Yu was arrogant and arrogant. As a result, he was fooled by the Wu people and lost his life. To some extent, Zhugeliang “killed” Guan Yu, but this “killing” was unintentional and not intentional. This is also a common mistake of the Liu Bei group.

Few people in the world can understand Zhugeliang, because Zhugeliang is a historical figure who has been “kidnapped” countless times. Most importantly, historians of all dynasties have “kidnapped” Zhugeliang. The so-called history of Zhugeliang that they left us has actually become more and more far away from the historical truth.

In Zhugeliang’s research field, three professors have been active recently. They are Mr. zhuziyan, a professor of Shanghai University, Mr. Hu juezhao, a retired professor of Shaanxi Normal University, and Mr. Yi Zhongtian, a professor of Xiamen University. In my opinion, these three professors did not understand Zhugeliang, and they continued to “kidnap” Zhugeliang and mislead readers who wanted the truth.

I will write another article to criticize Zhu Ziyan and Hu juezhao. First of all, let me briefly say that I admire the spirit of the two gentlemen’s courage to make breakthroughs. But I feel very disdainful for their lack of rigorous demonstration methods. Professor Zhu said that “Zhugeliang killed Guan Yu with a knife” and Hu Jue said that “Zhugeliang wanted to be emperor”. At first glance, it was quite new, but it simply could not stand further scrutiny.

Here, I want to focus on criticizing Mr. Yi Zhongtian. Although Mr. Yi has read many historical books and academic articles, he has not formed his own correct view, which is a great pity. Mr. Yi didn’t make a bold breakthrough in academia like the previous two. He basically brought other people’s views and said them in storytelling language. Therefore, the mistakes made by predecessors were basically inherited by Mr. Yi Zhongtian.

(I) Yi Zhongtian can’t understand Longzhong Dui

For Zhugeliang’s “Longzhong Dui” (also said “Caolu Dui”), Liu Bei’s evaluation is only one word: “good!”. The word “good” can be interpreted as “good” or “very good” However, Mr. Yi Zhongtian made a literary exaggeration of the word “goodness”. He said that Zhugeliang’s words in “Longzhong Dui” made Liu Bei’s words “refreshing, like waking up from a dream, suddenly enlightened.” This is obviously not a rigorous academic attitude.

In fact, the reason why Liu Bei said “kindness” to Zhugeliang was not that Zhugeliang “awakened the dreamer with a word”, but that some contents of “Longzhong Dui” were exactly what Liu Bei meant. Moreover, those words that “exactly match Liu Bei” only account for a small part of “Longzhong Dui”. In other words, there are not many bright spots in Longzhong Dui, but more content on paper.

Yi Zhongtian said, “Liu Bei invited Zhugeliang out of the cottage three times. From then on, he has a chief designer who can let him go from nothing to three parts of the world.” Unfortunately, Liu Bei never regarded Zhugeliang as the “chief designer”. Look at the tasks assigned by Liu Bei to Zhugeliang later: either tax collection, recruitment of recruits, logistics and transportation, or drafting documents, implementing criminal laws, or eliminating “internal enemies”. This has nothing to do with the strategic planning of “three parts of the world”.

Yi Zhongtian said, “it has been proved that the development of the situation later was entirely in Zhugeliang’s expectation. Therefore, historians commented that Zhugeliang ‘knew three points before leaving Longzhong’, and some even thought it was’ determined three points before leaving Longzhong ‘.” In fact, the development of the situation later was not “completely in Zhugeliang’s expectation” as Yi Zhongtian said, but completely out of Zhugeliang’s expectation.

Zhugeliang has two most important military propositions in Longzhong Dui, one is “Donghe Sunquan” and the other is “across Jinghe and Yili”. But Zhugeliang did not expect that Sun Quan also wanted to occupy Jingzhou. If Liu Bei insists on occupying Jingzhou, he will definitely conflict with Sun Quan in the future. In other words, “crossing Jingyi” is contradictory to “tying up Sun Quan”. Many years later, Liu Bei and Sun Quan fought openly and secretly over the Jingzhou issue, for which Guan Yu also lost his life. This was more unexpected than Zhugeliang had expected.

Of course, Sun Quan’s interest in Jingzhou doesn’t mean that Liu Bei can’t get Jingzhou. The problem is, you have to compete with Sun Quan for Jingzhou, and you have to draw out troops to get Yizhou. I’m afraid it’s difficult, isn’t it? For this reason, Mao Zedong once pointed out pointedly: “the defeat of Shuhan began with Longzhong Dui, and how can it be invincible if the troops are divided into two parts a thousand miles away?”

It can be seen that “Longzhong Dui” not only has no military value, but also hides fatal defects. Not long later, even Zhugeliang himself found this defect.

In the 13th year of Jian’an, Liu Bei was chased by Cao Cao’s army. Zhugeliang was ordered to go to Jiangdong to ask Sun Quan for help on behalf of Liu Bei. When he found that Sun Quan was also determined to win Jingzhou, he no longer insisted on his proposition of “crossing Jingzhou and benefiting”. After the battle of Chibi, Liu Bei went to Jingkou (Zhenjiang) to borrow the land of Jingzhou from Sun Quan, and Zhugeliang raised his objection. Zhugeliang thought that Liu Bei’s trip was too dangerous and that he might be killed by Soochow. This shows that Zhugeliang has seen that “Donghe Sunquan” and “occupying Jingzhou” are contradictory, and that Zhugeliang is quietly giving up the military strategy in Longzhong pair and no longer advocating for competing for Jingzhou.

Just when Zhugeliang gave up “Longzhong Dui”, Liu Bei simply ventured to Jingkou and borrowed several counties of Jingzhou from Sun Quan. So Liu Bei got most of the territory of Jingzhou.

The reason why Liu Bei ignored Zhugeliang’s advice and ventured to “borrow Jingzhou” was not because he wanted to implement the strategic plan of crossing Jing Yi in Zhugeliang’s Longzhong Dui, but because of his instinctive reaction under the pressure of survival. In order to find a way out for his 20000 men, he had to borrow land from Sun Quan.

However, Liu Bei’s “borrowing from Jingzhou” is very reluctantly and has endless hidden dangers. Zhugeliang was well aware of the benefits, so he was actually inclined to give up Jingzhou, but he couldn’t say what he really thought, because Liu Bei had regarded Jingzhou as a treasure. And Liu Bei is so stubborn, how can he change for Zhugeliang?

Sun Quan has been talking about reclaiming the land since he lent it to Liu Bei. Zhou Yu also had an idea: go over Liu Bei and attack Yizhou. This can force Liu Bei to abandon Jingzhou and develop westward. Unexpectedly, Liu Bei was insatiable. He not only wanted to win Yizhou, but also deliberately sought an excuse to refuse to return Jingzhou. So the sun Liu alliance began to deteriorate until the two sides turned against each other and saw each other.

From Liu Bei’s “borrowing Jingzhou” to Guan Yu’s “losing Jingzhou”, Zhugeliang did not express an opinion on the Jingzhou issue. Even when sun and Liu fought for Jingzhou, Zhugeliang was basically silent. All this shows that Zhugeliang has limited say, and Liu Bei did not regard Zhugeliang as any chief designer. In other words, Mr. Yi Zhongtian’s evaluation of Zhugeliang is absurd.

Liu Bei got Jingzhou by “borrowing”; Liu Bei got Yizhou by Cao Cao’s mistake. Due to Cao Cao’s neglect of Zhang song, the messenger sent by Liu Zhang, the herdsman of Yizhou, Zhang Song persuaded Liu Zhang to welcome Liu Bei into Sichuan, which made Liu Bei take the opportunity to plot against Liu Zhang and win Yizhou at one stroke. It depends on opportunity and luck, which has nothing to do with Longzhong DUI.

Although Zhugeliang mentioned “crossing Jing and Yi” in Longzhong Dui, it was just a crooked attack. Liu Bei never relied on Zhugeliang militarily, and the strategic thinking of “crossing Jing and Yi” achieved by Liu Bei was not related to Zhugeliang’s “Longzhong pair”. We can also infer that when Zhu Geliang put forward the idea of “crossing Jing and Yi” in Longzhong Dui, it was not favored by Liu Bei. Then why did Liu Bei call Zhugeliang “good” at that time? This is because he valued Zhugeliang’s political ability. What moved Liu Bei at that time was the second part of Zhugeliang’s speech “Longzhong Dui”. In this part of the report, Zhugeliang first affirmed Liu Bei’s noble status as “the servant of the emperor’s office”, praised Liu Bei’s “faithfulness in the world” and “thirst for talents”, and finally gave Liu Bei encouragement, saying that the people of the North would “eat and drink” warmly welcome Liu Bei’s Northern Expedition, and he also painted a moving picture of “hegemony can be achieved, Han Dynasty can be prosperous”. These are exactly what Liu Bei likes to listen to most. So Liu Bei began to feel that this person was very good for consolidating his rule! This is the reason why Liu Bei said “good” to Zhugeliang. As for Yi Zhongtian’s “Enlightenment”, it’s purely an unprovoked conjecture.

In a word, the reason why Liu Bei invited Zhugeliang out of the mountain was not because he had a crush on Zhugeliang’s military talent, but because he could bring benefits to his political centralization. I will further elaborate on this point in the future.

(II) Yi Zhongtian cannot understand “Jiangdong peace talks”

The “Jiangdong peace talks” is the key talks between sun and Liu to reach an alliance. The representative sent by Liu Bei is Zhugeliang, and the main negotiator of the Soochow side is Sun Quan himself. From the results of the peace talks, it seems that Zhugeliang persuaded Sun Quan on the surface, but in fact, Sun Quan took advantage of Liu Bei. It can be said that Zhugeliang suffered a lot in the “Jiangdong peace talks” and disgraced his mission. But Yi Zhongtian couldn’t see this. He believed that what Zhugeliang said to Sun Quan in the “Jiangdong peace talks” was “a classic of compromise, which can be regarded as a wonderful textbook of diplomacy.”

The reason why I say that Zhugeliang suffered a lot in the “Jiangdong peace talks” is that he was fooled by Sun Quan and spent too much energy on how to persuade Sun Quan, thus sacrificing many interests of Liu Bei. In fact, Sun Quan did not need persuasion at all. Because Sun Quan decided to fight Cao Cao in his heart.

Since Sun Quan intended to fight Cao, why did Zhugeliang bother to persuade Sun Quan to fight Cao? Isn’t this unnecessary? This is because Sun Quan used a very cunning scheme, which really deceived Zhugeliang.

Lu Su paid a visit to Liu Bei, which could have been regarded as Sun Quan’s initiative to reach out to Liu Bei for an olive branch. But when Lu Su led Zhugeliang to see Sun Quan, he suddenly found that the situation was a little bad. Sun Quan not only did not mean to actively fight against Cao Cao, but “supported the army in Chaisang and watched the success or failure”. (Biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms) and Jiang Dong’s ministers suggested Sun Quan to meet Cao Cao.

You may wonder, didn’t Sun Quan take the initiative to send Lu Su alliance Liu Bei? Didn’t Zhou Yu and Sun Quan make the decision to fight Cao Cao long ago? Why does such an accident happen at this moment?

In fact, Sun Quan didn’t really want to “wait and see success or failure”, he just wanted to play a play for Zhugeliang. Then, why did Sun Quan play the play of “wait and see success or failure”? Of course, it is to improve their position in the “Jiangdong peace talks” in order to obtain the best interests in the “Sun Liu alliance”.

Sun Quan knew that Liu Bei was a hero in the world. If the sun Liu alliance defeats Cao Cao this time, Liu Bei is likely to immediately grab the victory with himself. So he can’t help but guard against Sun Quan. The best way is to take advantage of Liu Bei’s critical situation and put forward a harsh terms of cooperation.

It is for this purpose that sun Quancai deliberately “wait and see success or failure”; Even in the face of the ministers’ proposal to welcome Cao, he did not publicly oppose it. He wanted Zhugeliang to know that my Sun Quan didn’t have to fight Cao Cao. In fact, I could also surrender to Cao Cao.

Zhugeliang was really worried about Sun Quan’s acting. He came up and said to Sun Quan: “There was chaos in the sea, and the general set up his army to occupy Jiangdong. Liu Yuzhou also took in all the Hannan and fought with Cao Cao for the world. Today, the great difficulty of Cao Cao and the barbarians was slightly over, so he broke down Jingzhou and shocked the whole world. The hero had no use of force, so Yuzhou fled here. The general dealt with it according to his strength: if he could compete with China with the people of Wu and Yue, it would be better to fight against it as early as possible; if he could not do it, why not tie up his weapons and fight in the North! Today, the general entrusted the name of obedience outside and hesitated inside , things are urgent and continuous, and there is no day for disaster! ” (Annals of the Three Kingdoms. Biography of Zhugeliang)

Zhugeliang actually used a method of motivating the general, which means: “you can fight if you can, and surrender if you can’t. don’t look like you want to fight if you don’t want to fight. Doing so will bring disaster.”

Sun Quan was not angry at Zhugeliang’s satire. Because what he wants is this effect: make Zhugeliang anxious. The more anxious you are, the more you ask for me, and the more benefits I will get in the future.

Sun Quan asked Zhugeliang, “if you let me surrender, why didn’t your Liu Bei surrender?” Zhugeliang’s answer was: “even people like Tian Heng can keep justice without humiliation. My Lord is a royal servant, and his talents are unparalleled and respected by the world. If such a great man is not successful, it can only be said that it is the will of heaven, how can he be willing to sink.”

(Biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms: Quan said, “Gou rujun said, why didn’t Liu Yuzhou succeed?” Liang said, “Tian Heng, the ears of the strong men of Qi, still guard righteousness and do not disgrace. Besides, the royal guards of Liu Yuzhou, their talents are unparalleled. All the scholars admire it. If the water returns to the sea, if things are bad, this is heaven, and can it be restored!”

Zhugeliang’s words are still full of irony. This time, Sun Quan deliberately pretended to be irritated. He said bluntly, “I can’t cite the whole Wu area. Hundreds of thousands of people are controlled by others. My plan is up!” (Annals of the Three Kingdoms. Biography of Zhugeliang)

Zhugeliang used two methods to motivate Sun Quan to say “my plan!”. But Sun Quan continued to calm down. He pretended to be very worried and asked Zhugeliang, “it’s not that I underestimated Liu Yuzhou’s strength. After all, he just lost the war. How much resistance can he have?”

Zhugeliang told Sun Quan, “although Liu Yuzhou was defeated by Changbanpo, there were 10000 soldiers returning, together with Guan Yu’s Navy elite armor, and Liu Qi also had 10000 people in Jiangxia. Cao Cao came from a long distance and marched too fast, breaking the taboo of military strategists, just as the military book said ‘he will defeat the general’; and Cao Jun did not learn water warfare, and his military morale was unstable. As long as our two families work together, it is not difficult to defeat Cao Cao.”

Sun Quan was not interested in the principles of war that Zhugeliang said, because Zhou Yu had already spoken for Sun Quan before. What interests Sun Quan most is that there are still 20000 people available at Liu Bei’s side. This was originally Liu Bei’s military secret, but it was revealed by Zhugeliang. Therefore, Sun Quan was “happy” at that time.

Sun Quan said, “well, since Liu Bei has only 20000 troops, I’ll take 30000 troops first.”.

(Biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms: Quan Bonan said, “I can’t cite the whole Wu region, where 100000 people are controlled by others. My plan is up! No one can be a Cao Cao unless Liu Yuzhou is defeated, but after the new defeat of Yuzhou, can I resist this difficulty?” Bright day: “Although the Yuzhou army was defeated by changban, there are now 10000 soldiers returning and the elite armor of Guan Yu’s water army, and there are no fewer than 10000 soldiers of Liu Qi Hejiang’s summer army. Cao Cao’s people have been tired from a long distance. They heard that they chased Yuzhou and rode lightly for more than 300 miles a day and night. This so-called ‘at the end of being strong, the potential can’t wear Lu Xuan’. Therefore, the art of war should be avoided, saying ‘the general will be defeated’. And people in the North don’t learn water warfare; and those who are attached to the people of Jingzhou force the soldiers to be powerful, and they are not convinced. Today’s general is sincere If you can command the powerful general to unify tens of thousands of troops, and work together with the Yuzhou plan, it is inevitable to break the military. If the army is broken, it will return to the north. In this way, the momentum of Jing and Wu will be strong and the formation of a confrontation will be carried out. The chance of success or failure lies in today. ” Quan Dayue sent 30000 sailors, including Zhou Yu, Cheng Pu and Lu Su, to follow Liang to the first lord and to resist Cao Gong.)

From the above historical data, we can see that Sun Quan is worthy of being a hero among people. Originally, he wanted to pull Liu Bei to fight against Cao Cao, but he deliberately made a “wait-and-see” appearance, which made Zhugeliang rack his brains to “persuade” him. In this way, the initiative of the “Jiangdong peace talks” naturally fell to Sun Quan.

So what are the core terms of the “Jiangdong peace talks”? Such a key problem, check all the history books, but there is no record. Is it true that the two sides just casually said that they would not talk about other terms after sending troops? Did they not stipulate how to distribute the post-war interests? Obviously, this crucial historical material has been hidden.

I boldly speculate that at that time, the “Jiangdong peace talks” was willing to set the post-war principle of interest distribution, which was that everything was up to Sun Quan the final say. Only in this way can we explain why Zhou Yu wanted to give Liu Bei land after the battle of Chibi; Only in this way can we understand why Liu Bei thought Zhou Yu’s land was too small and had to borrow several counties in Jingzhou from Sun Quan.

Liu Bei was not very satisfied with Zhugeliang’s trip to Jiangdong, because Liu Bei understood that Zhugeliang had been fooled by Sun Quan. Therefore, when the postwar reward was granted, Liu Bei only gave Zhugeliang a position as a military commander, and also sent him to Lingling, Guiyang and Changsha counties to be responsible for tax collection and adjustment there.

(Biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms: the first Lord then collected Jiangnan, took Liang as the commander of the army, and made him the governor of Lingling, Guiyang and Changsha, and adjusted his taxes to become a military entity.)

Compared with Zhugeliang, Guan Yu and Zhang Fei got a higher promotion. Among them, Guan Yu was promoted to Xiangyang prefect and Dangkou general; Zhang Fei became the prefect of Yidu, the general of the conquest, and the Marquis of the new pavilion.

Wang Fuzhi, a scholar at the end of the Ming Dynasty, believed that the joint efforts of sun and Liu to destroy Cao and Guan Yu could not take any credit. Zhugeliang was the greatest contributor to Liu Bei.

(on reading general learning: Zhuge Gongdong envoy, Lu Su Xijie, then decided the friendship between the two countries. Zi sun broke Cao with Cao, and Yu couldn’t do any meritorious work, but the meritorious work came from brightness.)

But how can Wang Fuzhi understand Liu Bei’s dissatisfaction with Zhugeliang?

Because the “Jiangdong peace talks” suffered too much, Liu Bei had to allow Sun Quan and Zhou Yu to distribute the victory results after the war. Liu Bei wanted to win the four poor counties in Jingnan, so he had to go to “reach the right to see the capital” first, and thus took on the debt of “borrowing Jingzhou”. Therefore, since the Jiangdong peace talks, Liu Bei has never allowed Zhugeliang to engage in diplomacy again.

Sun Quan’s acting was so lifelike that Chen Shou believed that Sun Quan sent troops to assist Liu Bei because he admired both Liu Bei and Zhugeliang’s talent and conduct.

(Biography of Zhugeliang in the annals of the Three Kingdoms: Quan is not only ready to serve, but also bright and elegant. He respects it very much, that is, he sends 30000 troops to help prepare. When he is ready to fight Emperor Wu, he will break his army, win victory and victory, and see peace in the south of the Yangtze River.)

In terms of the whole process of the “Jiangdong peace talks”, Sun Quan is the real diplomatic genius; Zhugeliang is not Sun Quan’s opponent at all.

(III) Yi Zhongtian cannot understand “borrow Jingzhou”

When studying the “Jingzhou dispute” in the history of the Three Kingdoms, many people wondered: since the great victory in Chibi was the result of the joint efforts of sun and Liu, the land in Jingzhou left by Cao Cao after his defeat should be divided equally between the two. Why did Liu Bei say to Sun Quan that he “borrowed Jingzhou” in history?

Many scholars really did not understand this problem, so they simply declared: Liu Bei never borrowed Jingzhou from Sun Quan; It was unreasonable for Sun Quan to ask Liu Bei to return Jingzhou. Mr. Yi Zhongtian followed this view in his book “tasting the Three Kingdoms” (Part 2).

If Liu Bei never “borrowed Jingzhou” as Yi Zhongtian said, why did Sun Quan keep begging Liu Bei for Jingzhou back? Why did Liu Bei promise to return Jingzhou to Sun Quan? Are Sun Quan and Liu Bei crazy or stupid? Obviously, Yi Zhongtian underestimated the IQ of the ancients.

In fact, the question that bothers Yi Zhongtian is not difficult to answer. The reason why Liu Bei wanted to “borrow Jingzhou” from Sun Quan was that sun and Liu had a “Jiangdong peace talk” before the battle of Chibi. One of the keynote of this “peace talk” was that Sun Quan should be responsible for the distribution of the victory achievements after the war. Only in this way can we understand why Zhou Yu gave Liu Bei the land on the South Bank of Nanjun; Only in this way can we understand why Liu Bei attacked the four counties in Jingnan after “reaching the right to see the capital” (Biography of Zhou Yu in the annals of the Three Kingdoms) and “borrowing several counties in Jingzhou from the right to reply” (Biography of Jiang Biao quoted in the annals of the three kingdoms.

Then, why can Sun Quan occupy a dominant position in the “Jiangdong peace talks”? That’s because Liu Bei is being chased by Cao Cao’s army, panicking like a lost dog. With Sun Quan’s help, Liu Bei was given the straw to save his life. Therefore, Zhugeliang once said to Liu Bei urgently, “please be ordered to ask general Yu sun for help.” (Annals of the Three Kingdoms. Biography of Zhugeliang)

Since Liu Bei is asking for help while Sun Quan is saving people, the terms of the peace talks between the two sides are naturally in favor of the latter. Although the treaty content of “Jiangdong peace talks” is not recorded in the annals of the Three Kingdoms. However, from the later development of the situation, the “Jiangdong peace talks” gave Sun Quan great benefits. We have reason to believe that there must be relevant provisions in the “Jiangdong peace talks” that the victory of Jingzhou belongs to Sun Quan.

Since Sun Quan was responsible for the distribution of the victory of Jingzhou, Liu Bei was too few to grab it, so he had to borrow it. There have been many frictions between sun and Liu because of the “Jingzhou dispute”, but Liu Bei has never said that Jingzhou is his own territory, nor has he denied the claim of “borrowing Jingzhou” face to face.

Lu Su once accused Guan Yu: “the country used to borrow land from the Qing family, but the Qing family’s army was defeated far away, so it didn’t think it was worth it. Now it has won Yizhou, and it has no intention to return it, but it begged three counties and didn’t obey orders.” Lu Su clearly pointed out here that we lent you the land, but you played tricks and didn’t return it. Guan Yu couldn’t deny this, so he had to talk to Wang Gu about him: “in the battle of Wulin, general Zuo was in the middle of the line, sleeping and working hard to break the Wei Dynasty. How can he be in vain, without a piece of soil, and come down to collect evil?” He meant that General Liu Bei should have a foothold after making such great contributions. Why do you want to take back these lands? In fact, Guan Yu’s words have tacitly accepted the saying of “borrowing Jingzhou”.

For Guan Yu, Lu Su bluntly attacked head-on and said: “You’re wrong. When Liu Yuzhou asked us for help, he was as terrified as a lost dog, and his life was much worse than now. It was my Master Sun Quan who took pity on Liu Yuzhou that protected him. Unexpectedly, Liu Yuzhou had ulterior motives, had already obtained Yizhou, but still wanted to occupy the land of Jingzhou. Is it tolerable or intolerable? Even ordinary people understand this truth, not to mention a national leader? I heard that he forgot to see benefits Righteous people will inevitably come to a bad end. If we don’t abide by the moral axiom and just want to bully the weak, how can we get the support of others? “

(in the annals of the Three Kingdoms, Lu Su said: “Otherwise, the people of Yuzhou are not in the same school. They are extremely worried, weak in ambition, and eager to flee far. They can’t hope for this. The Lord is jealous of the body of Yuzhou. There is no place, and he doesn’t love the power of the land scholars, so that he has shelter to help his troubles, and Yuzhou plays the role of love alone, which is evil and good. Now he has taken advantage of Xizhou, and wants to cut and merge the land of Jingzhou, which sgivanov can’t bear to do, and what’s more, the Lord of the whole leader! He must be jealous of greed and abandon his righteousness It’s a disaster. My son is an important task. He has never been able to clear the way and punish him. He has to rely on the weak to strive. He is an old teacher. How can he get help? ” Feather has no answer. Bei then cut the Xiangshui River as the boundary, so he stopped the army.)

Lu Su’s impassioned speech made Guan Yu “unable to answer”. This further illustrates the fact that the “Jiangdong peace talks” gave Sun Quan the right to distribute the fruits of Jingzhou, which was also the rope that Liu Bei could not get rid of.

Later, the sun and Liu families defeated Cao Cao in the battle of Chibi. Liu Bei survived the survival crisis and suddenly realized that he had suffered too much in the “peace talks”. He wanted to break through the shackles of the “Jiangdong peace talks”, so he resorted to the flexible tactics of going to Jingkou to borrow land, representing Liu Qi as the governor of Jingzhou, and leading the herdsmen of Jingzhou. Even if he used this series of means, he did not dare to deny the saying of “borrowing Jingzhou”. Therefore, in the face of Sun Quan’s behavior of begging for Jingzhou, Liu Bei once promised Sun Quan: “you must get Liangzhou, and you should match with Jingzhou.” (Annals of the Three Kingdoms. Biography of the first lord).

Mr. Yi Zhongtian didn’t straighten out the above logical relationship, so he misread the history of “borrowing Jingzhou”.

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